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Abstract 
The Arctic region is rapidly changing in a way that will affect the rest of the world.  Parts of Alaska, 
western Canada, and Siberia are currently warming at twice the global rate.  This warming trend is 
accelerating permafrost deterioration, coastal erosion, snow and ice loss, and other changes that are a 
direct consequence of climate change.  Climatologists have long understood that changes in the 
Arctic would be faster and more intense than elsewhere on the planet, but the degree and speed of 
the changes were underestimated compared to recent observations.   Policy makers have not yet had 
time to examine the latest evidence or appreciate the nature of the consequences.  Thus, the 
abruptness and severity of an unfolding Arctic climate crisis has not been incorporated into long-
range planning.  The purpose of this report is to briefly review the physical basis for global climate 
change and Arctic amplification, summarize the ongoing observations, discuss the potential 
consequences, explain the need for an objective risk assessment, develop scenarios for future 
change, review existing modeling capabilities and the need for better regional models, and finally to 
make recommendations for Sandia’s future role in preparing our leaders to deal with impacts of 
Arctic climate change on national security.  Accurate and credible regional-scale climate models are 
still several years in the future, and those models are essential for estimating climate impacts around 
the globe.  This study demonstrates how a scenario-based method may be used to give insights into 
climate impacts on a regional scale and possible mitigation.  Because of our experience in the Arctic 
and widespread recognition of the Arctic’s importance in the Earth climate system we chose the 
Arctic as a test case for an assessment of climate impacts on national security.  Sandia can make a 
swift and significant contribution by applying modeling and simulation tools with internal 
collaborations as well as with outside organizations.  Because changes in the Arctic environment are 
happening so rapidly, a successful program will be one that can adapt very quickly to new 
information as it becomes available, and can provide decision makers with projections on the 1-5 
year time scale over which the most disruptive, high-consequence changes are likely to occur.  The 
greatest short-term impact would be to initiate exploratory simulations to discover new emergent and 
robust phenomena associated with one or more of the following changing systems:  Arctic 
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hydrological cycle, sea ice extent, ocean and atmospheric circulation, permafrost deterioration, 
carbon mobilization, Greenland ice sheet stability, and coastal erosion.  Sandia can also contribute to 
new technology solutions for improved observations in the Arctic, which is currently a data-sparse 
region.  Sensitivity analyses have the potential to identify thresholds which would enable the 
collaborative development of “early warning” sensor systems to seek predicted phenomena that 
might be precursory to major, high-consequence changes.  Much of this work will require improved 
regional climate models and advanced computing capabilities.  Socio-economic modeling tools can 
help define human and national security consequences.  Formal uncertainty quantification must be 
an integral part of any results that emerge from this work.
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1.  Introduction:  Global Climate Change and Arctic 
Amplification 
The Earth has entered a period of rapid climate change, primarily driven by increases 
in atmospheric infrared opacity due to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases related 
to human activities.  A significant fraction of the thermal energy from Earth that would 
normally pass through the atmosphere and be radiated into space is instead absorbed by 
the higher concentration of molecules that interact with infrared radiation and are there 
because of human actions.  Part of this energy is re-radiated back to the surface, resulting 
in higher temperatures.  The physical basis of the greenhouse effect has been known for 
more than a century.  John Tyndall experimented with the greenhouse properties of gases 
starting in 1858 (Tyndall, 1870), and Svante Arrhenius described the warming effect of 
carbon dioxide quantitatively in a paper published more than a century ago (Arrhenius, 
1896).  Because of uncertainties in feedbacks associated with atmospheric and ocean 
circulation, water vapor concentrations, cloud properties, snow and ice cover, permafrost 
deterioration, biological and human adaptations, and other responses, precise quantitative 
forecasts will never be possible.  However, there is no known mechanism by which the 
atmospheric radiative imbalance can be completely compensated by feedbacks.  In the 
unlikely event that globally compensating feedbacks do exist, there is no known process 
by which the spatial distribution of heat transport would remain the same as it was before 
the atmosphere changed.   The feedbacks themselves would arise from some combination 
of changes in circulation, hydrological cycle, surface properties, and biological response.  
For this reason, accelerating anthropogenic climate change is a virtual certainty.  The 
severity and consequences of climate change are open questions that will always have 
some degree of uncertainty. 
The most useful measurement of climate state is global average surface air 
temperature, which has increased by about 0.6 or 0.7° C since the start of the industrial 
revolution, e.g. (Jones and Moberg, 2003).  Because Earth's climate is a complex and 
multifaceted dynamic system that is not sufficiently described by a single variable, 
"global warming" is only one aspect of the ongoing transition.  Other features of global 
climate change include changes in size, frequency, timing, and distribution of weather 
events and precipitation, increased drought and desertification, decreases in ocean pH, 
loss of biodiversity and ecosystems, reduction in sea ice extent, changes in the nature of 
land ice, and increased rate of sea level rise.  Earth's climate is a coupled, nonlinear 
dynamic system, so these changes are not independent, but include feedbacks that can 
lead to cascading, rapid, and unpredictable responses.  Moreover, these aspects of the 
climate system are strongly coupled to the human systems of agriculture, land use, 
industry, fisheries, trade, water use, and migration.  Instabilities and unpredictability in 
the physical and ecological parts of the Earth system lead inevitably to economic and 
geopolitical instability, e.g. (Stern, 2007), which can have national security implications.  
It has long been known that the Arctic is a critical component in the Earth’s energy 
distribution system.  It is strongly influenced by changes in radiative forcings, and it also 
is a powerful driver of the rest of the system.  The cause of this “Arctic amplification” is 
attributed primarily to ice-albedo feedback, first suggested by James Croll in 1875.  Ice 
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and snow are much more reflective than the underlying surface or seawater.  In a 
warming Earth, ice and snow begin to retreat at higher latitudes and altitudes, exposing 
the darker substrate and increasing the fraction of sunlight that is absorbed.   The strong 
positive feedback led to the prediction that as the Earth warmed, the effect would be more 
pronounced in the Arctic, where rapid temperature increases should be accompanied by 
loss of ice and snow.  More recent studies indicate the presence of other feedbacks, such 
as higher humidity, that also contribute to Arctic amplification, e.g. (Graversen, et al., 
2008). 
According to (Serreze and Francis, 2006), we are now approaching a threshold 
beyond which Arctic amplification will accelerate, leading to strong increases in surface 
air temperatures over the Arctic Ocean in the near future.  Model projections suggest that 
the threshold should be preceded by a “preconditioning phase” in which sea ice retreats 
and thins for several years.  Even a thin, young layer of ice acts as an insulator and 
mechanical barrier that constrains the flow of heat from the ocean to the atmosphere, and 
limits wind-driven currents.  However, once the threshold is crossed, the Arctic is 
expected to quickly transition to open water in the late summertime.   Wintertime re-
growth would be severely limited.  Moreover, because thermal, hydrological, and 
mechanical coupling between open water and atmosphere are both qualitatively and 
quantitatively different, the entire Arctic system would be expected to dynamically 
reorganize itself into a new but unknown configuration.   In general we know that the 
Arctic region will probably have reduced sea ice extent and significant changes in 
precipitation patterns but there is a great deal of uncertainty about how oceanic and 
atmospheric circulation, weather events, and ecosystems will adjust.  There is no a priori 
reason to expect that the reorganization of such a highly nonlinear system would be 
reversible or even stable.  Moreover, biological and human systems have adapted by 
natural and engineered optimization processes to the previously existing system, so it is 
unlikely that the net consequences of such a change would be beneficial. 
The Arctic system may have already reached its tipping point (Serreze, et al., 2007); 
(Holland, et al., 2006).  Consensus is growing that the transition to a seasonally ice-free 
Arctic Ocean is inevitable; however, there is no agreement about the speed or mechanism 
of this transformation.  There is increasing concern among Arctic climate specialists that 
there will be strong global consequences.  The possibilities of nonlinear cascading 
effects, particularly those involving changes in the hydrologic cycle, make prediction a 
challenge.  The Arctic ice serves as a buffer for the temperature of the northern 
hemisphere and the Arctic region controls much of the heat flow and circulation. 
However, the chaotic nature of the fluid interactions creates enormous uncertainty about 
the global response. 
There is no reason to think that these rapid and irreversible changes to the Arctic will 
be limited to sea ice.  Recent models suggest that Arctic land temperatures will increase 
at 3.5 times the average global rate (Lawrence, et al., 2008).  This rapid warming could 
reach as far as 1500 km into the Alaskan, Canadian, and Siberian mainland, causing 
permafrost to deteriorate quickly over a large area.  This warming, melting and thawing 
at high northern latitudes would also generate multiple cascading effects on the rest of the 
Earth system.  Destruction of permafrost releases methane, a powerful greenhouse gas 
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that would accelerate the increase in the atmosphere’s infrared opacity throughout the 
planet.  Warmer temperatures in the Arctic will likely lead to an increase in another 
important greenhouse gas: water vapor.  Arctic amplification also means that the average 
meridional temperature gradient that drives atmospheric and ocean circulation will 
change, altering weather patterns, storm tracks, temperature distributions, and currents 
worldwide.  
Arctic amplification explains why the strongest evidence of rapid global warming 
has emerged first at high northern latitudes; this region has been described as the “canary 
in the coal mine.”  Because of feedbacks in the nonlinear Earth system, we expect the 
enhanced effects in the Arctic to have multiple cascading effects on the climate at lower 
latitudes (Alley, 1995).  At the risk of mixing metaphors, we also describe the Arctic as 
the “regional tail that wags the global dog.”  Furthermore, Arctic climate change will 
have major direct effects on the economies, resource availability, infrastructures, 
shipping lanes, strategic assets, military operations, and indigenous peoples of the 
circum-Arctic nations, which include military and economic superpowers.  Because of 
the global nature of the world economy and trade, the rest of the world will also be 
affected by these changes; see (Backus and Strickland, 2008).  It is for these reasons that 
we believe the Arctic region should be the first major focus of Sandia’s attempts to 
anticipate national security implications of global climate change.  
A comprehensive report about Arctic climate change and its repercussions would 
require thousands of pages.  Because of the swift pace of the change and rapidly 
expanding research, an exhaustive survey would also be out of date by the time it was 
printed.  Our intention with this report is to provide a brief snapshot of the current state of 
Arctic change.  We sacrifice depth and completeness in order to highlight the most 
noteworthy recent observations in section 2, and we list a subset of possible 
consequences in section 3.   Section 4 provides a discussion of risk assessment methods 
that can be applied to climate change consequences, and why the term “conservative 
assumptions” has a very different meaning for engineers and security specialists than it 
does for scientific researchers.   In section 5 we use scenarios as a framework for 
planning and discussion, and in section 6 we describe approaches for Arctic modeling 
and how models can be improved.   Finally, section 7 provides recommendations about 
how Sandia can contribute to this very serious national security issue.   
This report is not intended to be a complete analysis.  Rather, we view it as a 
distillation of leading technical assessments on the subject of Arctic climate.  The most 
comprehensive summary of the rapidly-advancing scientific understanding of global 
climate change is provided by the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)1.  This document (hereinafter called “AR4”) was 
published in 2007, but because of its ponderous size and lengthy preparation time it is 
only current as of 2005.  For a very complete review of the impact of climate change on 
the Arctic region, we recommend the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment - Scientific 
Report2, published by Cambridge University Press (hereinafter called “ACIA”).  Despite 
the recent publication year, the ACIA is also slightly dated because of the extremely 
rapid pace of change, discovery, and scientific progress.   The ACIA contains very few 
references after 2003, and it made extensive use of the IPCC Third Assessment Report 
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(TAR)3, which was published in 2001 and “frozen” a year or two earlier.  Both of these 
reports are rich with graphics and data, and can be freely downloaded. 
The AR4 and ACIA are based on peer-reviewed primary literature, but because of 
the slow pace of scientific publishing relative to the speed of recent developments, we 
have also turned to other sources.  These include media reports, institutional press 
releases, and even the online log of a research vessel that was still at sea at the time of our 
writing.  In keeping with our desire for brevity and readability, we have avoided simply 
repeating information or reproducing graphs and figures that are in the two reports or 
readily available on Wikipedia and elsewhere on the Worldwide Web.  Likewise, to keep 
our reference list to a manageable size, we have chosen not to cite the primary literature 
that is already cited by AR4 and ACIA, except when we think it needs special emphasis.  
For that reason, most of our citations are to AR4, ACIA, and to information that has been 
published in the past five years or so.  We encourage interested readers to go to those 
sources first. 
This report was written during the last quarter of the International Polar Year 2007-
2008.  The fourth in a series of international polar years, IPY 2007-2008 began in March 
2007 and will conclude in March 2009, extending over twenty-four months in order to 
provide researchers with two full annual cycles for their studies of the Arctic and 
Antarctic.  IPY 2007-2008 demonstrates recognition by the international science 
community that polar regions are vitally important in the Earth climate system.    
Starting almost two hundred years ago the early polar explorers–Nansen, Shackleton, 
Scott, Byrd, Amundsen, and others–used sextants, dog sleds, skis, and wooden ships to 
investigate unknown regions.  We are fortunate today to have satellites, snow machines, 
hand-held GPS navigation, the Internet, and supercomputers to probe the polar regions.  
Yet we still face great uncertainties about the Arctic, its future, and its role in the Earth’s 
climate system.  This report is an early survey of those unknowns as they relate to climate 
change and how we might address them.  
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2.  Arctic Climate Change:  Observations and 
Projections 
This section provides a very brief survey of some of the climate-related changes that 
are already taking place in the Arctic, or that have been observed in the paleoclimate 
record.  Many of these changes had been predicted to be among the far-reaching effects 
global climate change, and are expected to continue or accelerate, even if mitigation 
strategies are implemented.  The present discussion is limited to observations of physical 
changes and projections for future changes.  The consequences of these changes–both 
ongoing and anticipated–are discussed in the next section. 
2.1 Surface air temperatures 
The global mean surface air temperature is the standard geophysical parameter that 
researchers use to quantify global climate change because it integrates spatial and 
temporal changes in the Earth’s energy balance and it can be determined empirically and 
objectively.  The Arctic surface air temperature has long been considered to be a 
bellwether of global climate change because of ice-albedo and other feedbacks that lead 
to Arctic amplification.  Mean annual surface air temperatures in the Arctic have 
increased by 2 or 3° C since the middle of the 20th century, with wintertime increases by 
as much as 4° C.  As shown in Figure 2.1 below, the ACIA reproduces a graph of these 
average temperatures from land-based weather stations north of 60° N, going back to 
1900, with maps showing that Alaska, western Canada and most of Siberia have 
experienced the most warming.  The notable mid-20th-century cooling is attributed to 
increased sulfate aerosols from fossil fuel burning, which has since been overtaken by 
accelerating greenhouse warming because of cumulative nature of greenhouse gases.  
Eastern Canada, Southern Greenland, and Eastern Siberia have cooled, suggesting that 
circulation patterns have also changed.  Figure 2.2 shows temperature projected by five 
models used by the IPCC for one emissions scenario.4  
The five general circulation models (GCMs) used in the ACIA report to project 
future warming exhibited significant variability in projected seasonal and regional 
temperature increases, especially in polar regions.  All five models predict that Arctic 
warming will be much greater than global warming, with estimates of an additional 4 to 
6° C (relative to the 1981-2000 average) before the end of the 21st century for the 
moderately optimistic B2 emissions scenario of the IPCC.   However, even the most 
sensitive of the five ACIA models greatly underestimated the change that has now 
emerged as the most visible sign of Arctic warming:  the loss of sea ice.  Higher Arctic 
temperatures are also responsible for observed accelerated melting of the Greenland ice 
sheet, which has global consequences.  According to climatologist Konrad Steffan of the 
Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES, University of 
Colorado), “For every degree (F) increase in the mean annual temperature near 
Greenland, the rate of sea level rise increases by about 10 percent.” 5 
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Figure 2.1.  Annual average near-surface air temperature from stations on land 
relative to the average for 1961–1990, for the region from 60º to 90º N; updated 
from (Peterson and Vose, 1997) in ACIA, Chapter 1. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.  Average surface air temperatures projected by the five ACIA-
designated climate models for the B2 emissions scenario (see ACIA Chapter 4 
for further details). The heavy lines are projected average global temperature 
increases and the thinner lines the projected average Arctic temperature 
increases. 1981-2001 average temperatures shown.  
Arctic 
Global 
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2.2 Sea ice loss 
Melting of Arctic sea ice has long been identified as one of the strongest signals of 
climate change.  Ice cover is now disappearing at an alarming and unprecedented rate, 
well beyond the most pessimistic predictions.  The most cautious ACIA model projected 
a “near-total melting of Arctic sea ice by 2100.”  Taking recent trends into account, 
(Maslowski, 2007) now estimates that a seasonally ice-free Arctic could happen as early 
as 2013. 
The extreme developments of the past two summers can be put into perspective by 
reviewing scientific reactions to the records of previous years.  Prior to the 2005 ACIA 
report, the record for minimum sea ice was set in September, 2002, when its extent was 
reduced by 15% from the 1979-2000 average minimum of 7.0 million km2 (Figure 2.3).  
At that time, according to researcher Mark Serreze of the National Snow and Ice Data 
Center (NSIDC),6 “the 2002 sea-ice record is the most recent evidence of a downward 
trend in Arctic sea ice in the decades since satellite monitoring began.”  Others pointed 
out that the 2002 minimum may have been the lowest in several centuries.  Serreze 
suggested that, "with these trends, we may see an approximate 20% reduction in the 
annual mean sea ice by 2050, and by then we might be approaching no ice at all during 
the summer months."  This ice forecast may have seemed excessively pessimistic in 2002 
but now appears restrained.  By September 2007, the ice cover had decreased to 4.28 
km2, nearly 40% below the long-term average.  
  
Because the canonical long-term average only considers the years 1979 though 2000, 
during which there was already a downward trend, the summer minimum sea ice extent 
may already has fallen by as much as 50% since the 1950s.  The rate of loss is 
accelerating, apparently due to ice-albedo feedback effects.  In the summer of 2008–for 
the second year in a row–the sea ice extent had dropped below 5 million km2 before the 
Figure 2.3.  Historical September arctic sea ice extent (NSIDC) 
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end of August, a low that had never been reached even at the time of the September 
minimum in previous years.   Ice volume is difficult to measure as precisely as extent, 
because thickness cannot be determined by remote sensing.  Nevertheless, there is 
evidence that ice volume is shrinking at an even faster rate than its areal extent because 
thicker, older ice is being replaced by younger, thinner ice.  This makes the sheet more 
vulnerable in the future, because young ice is less resistant to melting.   In 2001, before 
the recent acceleration in melting, the volume was already down by 40% according to the 
Office of Naval Research report “Naval Operations in an Ice Free Arctic”.7  The sea ice 
has now almost certainly shrunk to less than half its pre-warming volume.  According to 
NSIDC, the 2008 ice minimum has likely set a new record for low volume even though 
the area increased slightly from the all-time low in 2007.8 
Many researchers think the tipping point has already passed and that losses will 
continue to accelerate, partly because of ice-albedo feedback but also because of more 
subtle positive feedbacks.  For example more edges of the sheet are exposed to the 
mechanical action of waves.  Large swaths of sea ice break off and melt much more 
rapidly because of the increase in edge length.  Losses of ice from the remaining Arctic 
ice shelves (which are grounded, rather than floating) are accelerating even more rapidly.  
Ellesmere Island’s ice shelves are thought to be 4,000 years old, but are in the process of 
disappearing.  In the summer of 2008, a 55 km2 ice sheet broke off of the Markham Ice 
Shelf, bringing the total ice shelf loss to about ten times what had been predicted for the 
season. 
This ongoing trend is particularly troubling because sea ice moderates global climate 
by reflecting incoming solar radiation and keeping the Arctic region cooler than it would 
otherwise be.  The Arctic system is buffered by the ice in many ways.  The temperature is 
buffered by the latent energy required for melting.  The hydrological cycle is buffered by 
the capping effect that keeps liquid water isolated from the air.  Wind-driven currents are 
buffered by the mechanical barrier provided by the ice sheet.  Since the end of the last ice 
age about 10,000 years ago, the Arctic has been remarkably stable, probably because of 
the constancy of both land and sea ice and its ability to buffer small changes.   It can be 
argued that this Arctic stability is to a large degree responsible for the atypical global 
climate stability during the period that witnessed the ascent of agriculture and civilization 
(Feynman and Ruzmaikin, 2007). 
The recent rapid changes in ice extent and configuration of the physical properties of 
the Arctic Ocean have created a regional geography that is very different than any time in 
recorded history.  This is likely to have a profound effect on the surrounding regions, and 
on global climate.  Because the changes are happening so quickly compared to initial 
estimates of change, little research has been done to understand how these changes will 
continue to evolve or their consequences for Earth’s inhabitants. 
2.3 Coastal erosion  
Erosion of the Arctic coast is also accelerating as a consequence of climate change.  
The extent and duration of open water adjacent to the shore is increasing, so wind and 
waves have a longer time to act on coastal sediments.  The sediments themselves are 
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more vulnerable to erosion as the warming of hard layers of permafrost causes them to 
melt, lose their stability, and subside.   Moreover, patterns of atmospheric circulation are 
changing, and stronger winds blowing across longer ice-free fetches produce higher 
waves with more erosive potential.  Coastlines that were protected by large expanses of 
sea ice in the past are now being battered by big waves during the seasonal retreat of the 
ice.   These increases in erosion will be exacerbated by rising sea levels and higher storm 
surges, if present trends continue.   Erosion rates have already doubled along some 
sections of the Alaskan Arctic Coastline (Mars and Houseknecht, 2007), even prior to the 
recent record-breaking sea ice losses.  Coastal erosion redoubles the positive feedbacks 
because it accelerates degradation of coastal permafrost which increases the release of 
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.  Greenhouse gases increase the rate of global 
warming, and the permafrost degradation increases the rate of coastal erosion, in a 
vicious circle characteristic of positive feedback. 
Both ecological and human systems are affected by coastal erosion.  Erosion rates of 
historically-stable shores can become remarkably fast.  According to a 2005 report on 
Arctic Coastal Dynamics,9 the island Muostakh of the Siberian Arctic Coast is 
experiencing coastal retreat rates of several meters per year.  At this rate the island will 
be completely destroyed within 50 years.  Its prehistoric carbon will be returned to the 
atmosphere, and its ecosystems will be irreversibly lost. 
Other effects of coastal erosion include the increase of offshore sedimentation which 
can affect marine ecosystems and fisheries.  Thawing of permafrost is also increasing the 
rate of Arctic river erosion and sediments that are carried to the sea.  Benthic (bottom-
dwelling) organisms are dependent on organic material that descends from the shallow, 
food-producing layers.  Increasing the fraction of inorganic sediments from coastal 
erosion is likely to disrupt the balance of both shallow and deep-water ecosystems.   
2.4 Permafrost degradation 
Permafrost is defined as sediment that has remained below the freezing point of water 
for two or more consecutive years.  According to the U. S. Arctic Research 
Commission’s 2004 report on Climate Change, Permafrost, and Impacts on Civil 
Infrastructure,10 it makes up 24% of the land area in the Northern Hemisphere and 
contains about 30% of the worldwide soil carbon reservoir, which is now estimated to be 
about twice as much carbon as contained in the atmosphere (Schuur, et al., 2008).  The 
permafrost is concentrated in a geographical band at high latitudes that crosses Siberia, 
Fennoscandia, Greenland, Canada, and Alaska.  One effect of polar amplification is the 
acceleration of permafrost melting inland from the Arctic Ocean.  According to the 2005 
ACIA summary, temperatures of permafrost on land surrounding the Arctic Ocean have 
increased by amounts ranging from a few tenths of a degree to as much as 3° C over the 
past few decades.  The ACIA report estimates that permafrost degradation is likely to 
take place over 10 to 20% of the present area of permafrost.  The permafrost area is likely 
to retreat northward by several hundred kilometers.  This estimate may already be out of 
date, because new evidence suggests that changes are happening more rapidly. 
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New models and observational data suggest that temperature increases associated 
with the accelerated ice loss will penetrate up to 1500 km inland  (Lawrence, et al., 
2008).   This would lead to heat accumulation and rapid melting of permafrost.  The 
heating and degradation of permafrost has several important effects on the Earth system.  
Like the Arctic sea ice, permafrost serves as a buffer.  Permafrost moderates the transfer 
of heat, water, nutrients, and gasses between the solid Earth and the atmosphere.  It also 
provides stability to sediments.  This added stability prevents them from subsiding and 
eroding.  Most importantly, carbon dioxide and methane are released to the atmosphere 
by bacteria and fungi as they process the organic material at temperatures above the 
freezing point.  Many researchers are concerned that this could become a dominant 
positive feedback in the climate system.  The warming accelerates the release of 
greenhouse gases, and the accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere reinforces the 
warming.  This runaway greenhouse effect may be one of the reasons why past ice ages 
have ended so abruptly compared to their gradual onset. 
If a significant fraction of the carbon now frozen in terrestrial permafrost were 
released to the atmosphere, it could dwarf the amount that is being released by human 
activities.   Scientific understanding has progressed rapidly since compilation of ACIA 
and AR4.  It has just been determined, for example, that in East Siberia alone the wind-
blown Yedoma permafrost contains about 450 billion tons of easily-mobilized carbon 
(Zimov, et al., 2006).  This is about as much carbon as the rest of the Arctic combined, 
and the same amount of carbon that has been released by all the burning of fossil fuels 
since the beginning of the industrial revolution.  If the Arctic were to warm up enough to 
decompose only 1% of the permafrost per year, it would double the carbon releases to the 
atmosphere from the present rate due to human activities (about 9 billion tons/year). 
There is mounting observational evidence that the Yedoma is releasing methane at an 
accelerating rate.  For example, the area of Siberian thermokarst lakes is expanding 
because of the warming, and more methane is bubbling out (Walter, et al., 2006).    New 
models of the Yedoma suggest that it is vulnerable to future warming, with a tipping 
point for irreversible carbon mobilization that depends on both temperature and warming 
rate (Khvorostyanov, et al., 2008). 
Permafrost also exists along the coast and at the bottom of the sea.  Most of this 
subsea permafrost was formed during past glacial epochs, when sea level was lower.   It 
has remained stable during the interglacial periods between ice ages because its 
temperature is mediated by the ocean and floating sea ice and is protected from the heat 
from the sun and from the warm summer air.  Within and beneath the subsea permafrost 
are methane hydrates, which contain vast stores of methane that have been locked up for 
hundreds of millennia.  Subsea permafrost has been thought to act as an impermeable 
layer that keeps this methane source sequestered.  Some researchers have speculated that 
climate change could release large quantities of subsea methane to the atmosphere, 
exacerbating the causes of global warming (Judge and Majorowicz, 1992; Kvenvolden, 
1988).    
As this report was in preparation, Igor Semiletov, the Chief Scientist of the 
International Siberian Shelf Study 2008 (ISSS-08) logged a new discovery on the 
International Arctic Research Center (IARC) University of Alaska Fairbanks expedition 
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web site.  He reported the discovery of  “several new areas of substantial methane seeps”  
by the research vessel Yacob Smirniskyi off the Siberian coast and a “new field of 
dissolved methane hot spots” in the Laptev Sea, which he says confirms the conclusion 
that “sub-sea permafrost is not a non-permeable lid for deep methane leakage.”11  One of 
the expedition leaders, Orjan Gustafsson (Stockholm University) elaborated, “Yesterday, 
for the first time, we documented a field where the release was so intense that the 
methane did not have time to dissolve into the seawater but was rising as methane 
bubbles to the sea surface. These 'methane chimneys' were documented on echo sounder 
and with seismic [instruments].”12  These findings are from an expedition that was still in 
progress at the time this report was written, and it is significant that the pace of Arctic 
change and discovery is exceeding the speed at which new data and papers can be peer 
reviewed and published. 
2.5 Greenland ice sheet and sea level 
Greenland has more land ice than anywhere else on Earth other than Antarctica.  The 
volume of the Greenland ice sheet, which represents 10% of the worlds freshwater, 
would raise sea level by about 7 meters if it were to melt (see NOAA’s Arctic Report 
Card 2008).13  Historically, the cap has been melting very slowly and has contributed to 
about 1.8 mm of sea level rise per year.  The rate has been accelerating, but the increase 
has nearly been compensated by an increase in precipitation associated with higher 
temperatures, and the consequent accumulation of snow.  The ice sheet covers about 85% 
of Greenland’s land area and is more than 2 km thick in places.  Large sheets of land ice 
have disappeared very rapidly at the end of past glacial periods when melting began, 
causing sea level to rise about 1.2 meter per century over the 8000 year period just prior 
to the Holocene (AR4).  The area of surface melt is increasing, and grew by 16% between 
1979 and 2002.   
According to (Gregory, et al., 2004), about half the volume of snowfall on Greenland 
is lost through melting of the ice sheet, and the other half is lost in the form of icebergs.  
Recent ice loss rates and the flow rates of glaciers have been determined by remote 
sensing methods, including satellite-based laser altimetry, gravimetry, and radar 
interferometry measurements.  Net volume loss during the 1990s was about 60 km3/year, 
increasing to about 80 km3/year by the end of the century (Krabill, et al., 2004; Thomas, 
et al., 2006).  More recent gravimeter measurements show that the rate has increased to 
as much as 248 km3/year (Chen, et al., 2006; Luthcke, et al., 2006; Ramillien, et al., 
2006; Velicogna and Wahr, 2006).  The sheet is melting most rapidly at the edges, and in 
fact may be thickening toward the center due to increased precipitation.  Additional 
increases in the loss of ice sheet volume are due to the acceleration of glaciers along the 
margin, (Rignot and Kanagaratnam, 2006; Stearns and Hamilton, 2007).   The losses may 
continue to accelerate due to positive feedback mechanisms associated with water from 
melting at the surface that infiltrates and lubricates the flow (Parizek and Alley, 2004; 
Zwally, et al., 2002), as well as increasing contact with warming and rising sea water 
(Bindschadler, 2006; Howat, et al., 2005; Thomas, 2003).  The large uncertainty 
associated with the estimates and the short period during which satellite observations 
have been made lead to questions of whether the recently-observed trends are a climate-
change-induced acceleration or part of a recurring pattern of variability.  Nevertheless, 
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(Wouters, et al., 2008) have now determined that accelerating loss in Greenland ice sheet 
volume has contributed an average of 0.5 mm/year to rising sea levels between 2003 and 
2008.14  Most models predict that realistic emissions scenarios will lead to complete 
melting of the Greenland ice sheet, but there is lack of consensus as to how rapidly 
melting will occur. 
2.6 Clouds and aerosols 
Low-level boundary layer clouds tend to dominate in the Arctic with very high 
temporal frequencies in all seasons (Curry, et al., 1996; Intrieri, et al., 2002a).  A 
particularly important feature is that these clouds are often mixed-phase (Shupe, et 
al., 2005)  even at quite low temperatures, consisting of liquid-water tops that 
precipitate ice (Pinto, 1998), or even multiple liquid-water layers embedded within 
precipitating ice (Intrieri, et al., 2002b; Verlinde, et al., 2007).  Surface clouds may 
play an important role in the ice-albedo feedback process, because the added moisture 
from the increased open water due to sea ice melting promotes cloud formation.  
These clouds do not necessarily influence Arctic climate in the way one would 
anticipate from experience at lower latitudes.  In the Arctic, clouds warm the surface 
rather than cool it for all but a few weeks a year, around the summer solstice.   For 
most of each year, outgoing infrared radiation in the Arctic exceeds incoming visible 
radiation from the sun. Clouds interfere with the outgoing radiation and hence act to 
warm the surface. A large fraction of the outgoing radiation energy is “imported” 
from lower latitudes. To understand the surface cloud radiative forcing it is necessary 
to understand the factors that regulate the cloud microphysical processes, in particular 
the liquid-water phase. 
Anthropogenic aerosols are a wild card for Arctic climate change.  The radiative 
balance is directly affected by absorption and scattering of the aerosol pollutants 
associated with the sulfate-rich persistent haze that is present during the Arctic winter 
and spring.  Because the haze absorbs light, the direct effect is to raise the 
temperature of the atmosphere.  However, there are also low albedo, soot-
contaminated aerosols that can lead to strong radiative heating of snow and ice at the 
surface.  The mechanisms by which Arctic haze evolves–and which control its 
radiative effects–may involve organic processes at the sea surface, photochemical, 
and other processes that are subject to climatic feedbacks in ways that are poorly 
understood. 
Subtle changes in aerosol conditions can also have major indirect radiative 
effects by changing the optical properties of clouds.  Detailed cloud-resolving model 
studies suggest that modest increases in ice nuclei concentrations in Arctic mixed-
phase clouds can transform a largely liquid stratus deck of wide aerial coverage into a 
broken, optically thin cloud system (Harrington and Olsson, 2001; Harrington, et al., 
1999; Jiang, et al., 2000; Morrison, et al., 2005; Prenni, et al., 2007).  Based on 
observations from the Mixed-Phase Arctic Cloud Experiment (M-PACE); (Verlinde, 
et al., 2007) conducted on the north slope of Alaska in October 2004, (Fridlind, et al., 
2007) concluded that observed concentrations of ice nuclei are insufficient by several 
orders of magnitude to explain observed ice, and that other mechanisms have to be 
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invoked to explain ice formation in mixed-phase clouds. Aerosol variations also 
appear to have a direct impact on the surface cloud radiative forcing through the 
liquid phase: recent work (Garrett, et al., 2004; Lubin and Vogelmann, 2006) 
suggested a longwave indirect effect of aerosol, in which higher droplet numbers and 
smaller droplet sizes increases the longwave emissivity of clouds.  In addition to these 
aerosol effects, cloud liquid water content depends on cloud-scale dynamics, sea ice 
coverage and thickness, and large-scale atmospheric circulation patterns (Curry, et 
al., 1990; Curry, et al., 1996; Harrington and Olsson, 2001; Jiang, et al., 2000; 
Vavrus, 2004), all of which have strong seasonal dependence. 
2.7 Precipitation and extreme weather 
An integral part of the Arctic hydrological cycle is precipitation.  There is an 
enormous variation in precipitation around the Arctic region, ranging from 300 cm/year 
in southern coastal parts of Alaska, Iceland, and Norway, down to 15 cm/year in inland 
parts of Siberia.15  Precipitation is controlled by proximity to warm ocean currents that 
provide heat and moisture, and by atmospheric circulation and weather patterns.  Arctic 
precipitation also shows strong seasonal variability.  Increases in Arctic precipitation 
rates were a predicted aspect of climate change,  These increases have been observed in 
long-term weather records, but have been accompanied by decreases in the duration of 
snow cover, exacerbating positive ice/snow albedo feedbacks that lead to further 
warming.  
Extreme weather events in the Arctic are usually associated with Arctic cyclones, 
which are low-pressure systems with high winds and counterclockwise flow.   Arctic 
cyclones transport heat and moisture to higher latitudes, and are responsible for major 
precipitation events in the form of snowstorms and blizzards.  These storms are the most 
damaging, and generate sea waves that are primarily responsible for coastal erosion.  
Research has shown that Arctic cyclone activity increased in the second half of the 20th 
century (Zhang, et al., 2004)16 and there is evidence that the distribution pattern of storms 
has shifted poleward.  This trend is superimposed on a shorter-period oscillation, and 
suggests a link to ongoing Arctic climate change. 
2.8 Arctic Oscillation 
The Earth’s climate system is characterized by oscillations on various times scales 
that span many orders of magnitude.  Some oscillations are based on deterministic 
external forcings.  For example the Earth’s annual trip around the sun changes the 
distribution of sunlight falling on the surface, resulting in seasons.  The wobble of the 
Earth on its axis, its changing tilt, and the variation of the orbital eccentricity on a ten-
thousand-year timescale leads to Milankovitch cycles that result in quasi-periodic ice 
ages. 
There are also cycles associated with internal interannual variability of the Earth 
system, which appears to have natural oscillations.  Our understanding of these is based 
primarily on empirical observations.  The most famous cycle is the El-Nino/Southern 
Oscillation, which is associated with the temperature of tropical Pacific waters and their 
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coupling to atmospheric circulation.  This oscillation is responsible for major shifts in 
weather and precipitation patterns on both sides of the Pacific Ocean.   
The Arctic Oscillation is characterized by regional sea-level pressure variations that 
exhibit a see-saw pattern in which multi-year cycles between high and low pressure in the 
Arctic are balanced by pressure anomalies of the opposite sign at northern mid-latitudes.  
The “warm phase” occurs when the Arctic pressure is low, north Atlantic westerly winds 
are stronger, the U. S. gets a warm winter, northern European weather is warm and wet, 
and the Mediterranean region is dry.  In the “cool phase” the Arctic pressure is high, 
westerlies are weak, the U. S. and European winters are cold, and the Mediterranean is 
stormy.   
There is growing evidence the Arctic Oscillation is changing from a cool-phase 
dominated pattern to a stronger and longer warm phase.  The most recent warm phase has 
come with new wind and ocean circulation patterns that have caused warmer saline 
waters to flow further into the Arctic Ocean than it usually does.17  This change has 
helped accelerate the sea ice melting, which may create a feedback that sustains this 
phase for an extended period, leading to an ice-free Arctic and fundamentally different 
climate in the future. 
2.9 Paleoclimate 
Some of the best data for reconstructing Earth’s past climate have come from the 
Greenland ice cores, which record stable isotope signatures of Arctic climate.  The 
oxygen isotope ratio is a proxy for the temperature history over central Greenland and 
reveals a remarkable degree of relative stability since the last ice age ended about 10,000 
years ago at the beginning of the Holocene epoch.   Before that, global climate was 
constantly changing, sometimes very abruptly.  Even during the stable Holocene, there is 
evidence for significant climatic shifts, especially on regional scales.   Human civilization 
and agriculture arose during the Holocene, during a long period of relative climate 
stability.    
One of the most significant scientific results from the Greenland ice cores is the 
recognition that climate can shift very suddenly and unexpectedly.   In the past 100,000 
years, there have been at least 25 fast climate transitions in which temperatures on 
Greenland shifted by 5° C within a few decades.  Most notable is research showing that 
about 11,500 years ago, temperatures increased by 8° C within 40 years, with much of 
the warming taking place over shorter intervals (Alley, 2000).18  These events appear to 
be related to sudden changes in the North Atlantic circulation that transports equatorial 
heat to high latitudes, possibly from an influx of freshwater that creates a buoyant layer, 
preventing cold water from sinking to be replaced by warmer surface waters from the 
south.  Large freshwater discharges can result from rapid melting if ice sheets and 
collapses of ice dams with releases of water from lakes.  These results suggest that rapid 
changes in the Arctic ice can be amplified in a cascading sequence with global 
consequences. 
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Newer methods of analyzing the ice cores are improving the resolution and revealing 
that changes can happen much faster than previously thought. (Steffensen, et al., 2008) 
have now shown that as the precursor to a major warm period that began 14,700 years 
ago, the atmospheric circulation reorganized and shifted to an entirely different state 
within 1 to 3 years.  Patterns of dust in the ice cores suggest that the shift was 
accompanied by major changes in precipitation patterns as far away as Asia.  The 
sobering implication is that the current perception of climate stability might be an 
illusion.  If the past is a guide to the future, there is good reason to think an abrupt global 
change could be triggered by the rapid changes that are now taking place in the Arctic. 
The most significant global warming event known to have occurred in the history of 
the Earth is the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM).  About 55 million years 
ago, global temperatures rose by 6° C within a period of about 20,000 years (Kennett and 
Stott, 1991).   The temperature increase was greatest in the polar regions, where mean 
surface air temperatures rose to as high as 20° C (Shellito, et al., 2003), and sea surface 
temperatures near the North Pole reached 22° C (Sluijs, et al., 2006).   One consequence 
of this global warming episode was the greatest mass extinction in the past 90 million 
years, with the loss of 35 to 50% of deep sea benthic formaminferal species (Thomas, 
1998).  The leading hypothesis for the cause of this climate collapse is a runaway 
greenhouse warming involving the destabilization of sea floor methane hydrates and 
catastrophic releases of carbon to the atmosphere when the ocean temperatures warmed 
(Dickens, et al., 1995).  (Bowen, et al., 2006) describe how recent advances in PETM 
research provide insight into current climate change. 
“During the PETM, carbon addition to the oceans and atmosphere of a magnitude 
similar to those anticipated through the 21st century. The event initiated global 
warming, biotic extinction and migration, and fundamental changes in the carbon and 
hydrological cycles that transformed the early Paleogene world.” 
The mean global temperature increase during this mass extinction was similar to the 
upper range of the IPCC estimates for 21st-century warming.  Perhaps the biggest 
difference between this prehistoric climate change and the current warming is that 
temperature is currently rising hundreds of times faster than its average rate of increase 
during the PETM catastrophe. 
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3. Consequences of Arctic Climate Change 
This section provides a list of some of the consequences of climate-related change in 
the Arctic.  As physical and geographical changes proceed, new economic opportunities 
are emerging as well economic threats and the prospect of new conflicts.  Many aspects 
of climate change can have impacts on national security because of effects on human 
activities both within the Arctic region and around the world. 
3.1 Shipping 
In the summer of 2008, the North Pole could—for the first time in history—be 
circumnavigated in open waters.   The Northwest Passage above Canada and Northern 
Sea Route (NSR) above Eurasia were simultaneously ice free.  If the trend of decreasing 
sea ice continues or accelerates, these passages will become reliable for shipping, and 
will become the default routes for transporting goods between Europe, Asia, and North 
America for at least part of the year.  The NSR is more than 40% shorter than the 
southern routes through the Suez or Panama canals, for shipments between Northern 
Europe and Northeast Asia or the American Northwest, according to information from 
the International Northern Sea Route Programme.19   Shipping via the NSR also has the 
advantages of avoiding cargo ship size restrictions imposed by the canals and the 
increasing piracy problems in the Indian and Eastern Pacific Oceans.  It has not been used 
as a major trade route because historically it has been choked with ice, and it was under 
strict Soviet control until 1991. 
The NSR traverses Russian territorial waters.  During the peak of its military power 
in the 1980s, the Soviet Union maintained a fleet of 16 icebreakers (half of which were 
nuclear) that patrolled the NSR.  As the Soviet Union was in the process of dissolving, 
Russia formally opened the route to foreign ships in 1991.  The Russian military 
icebreaker fleet is rapidly aging and, unless replacements are built, will decline to 3 ships 
by 2015.  However, the Russian commercial icebreaker fleet is rapidly modernizing with 
the addition of icebreakers and ice-capable tankers that can navigate the NSR.  Russia is 
in the process of shifting resources to the port of Murmansk, home of the Russian 
Northern Fleet, and the northernmost city in Fennoscandia.  In recent public statements, 
former Russian president Putin promoted construction of new icebreakers.  Many 
commentators expect international shipping through the NSR to grow rapidly if the 
climate trend continues and if Russia establishes a stable and reasonable tariff system.   
The Northwest Passage is likewise becoming a viable shipping route, but an 
international disagreement is emerging over whether it traverses waters that are interior to 
Canada, or whether it is entirely in international waters.  Neither the U. S. nor the E. U. 
recognizes Canadian claims of sovereignty.  This is a major concern in Canada, and it 
was a significant campaign issue in Prime Minister Harper’s 2006 election.  However, the 
increased physical accessibility could lead the U. S. toward reconciliation.  It may be to 
U.S.’s advantage to acknowledge Canadian control in return for guarantee of passage, 
thereby gaining a strategic and security advantage.  Both the U. S. and the Canadian 
governments have announced plans to build up their Arctic fleets.   
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3.2 Oil, gas, minerals, resources 
The Arctic is becoming more accessible for exploitation at precisely the same time 
that energy and minerals are becoming more valuable.  According to a July 2008 report 
by the U. S. Geological Survey,20 as much as 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 
30% of undiscovered gas reserves are in the Arctic seabed.  A recent report by the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)21 states that the Arctic may contain up to 
100 billion barrels of oil and 25% of the Earth’s remaining oil and gas.  The CSIS 
summary reiterates the consequences of changing Arctic climate on these resources.  
“Climate change in the Arctic is occurring at an ‘unprecedented’ rate, and the Far 
North is the most appropriate place to study global warming… Until recently, experts 
saw arctic hydrocarbon resources as too expensive and too difficult to extract. This 
has changed as technology has progressed and the price of oil has continued to 
increase, and countries are now staking their claims.” 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives coastal 
states sovereignty in a zone that reaches to a 200-nautical mile limit, but stipulates an 
extension for islands, sea mounts, or shallow waters associated with the continental shelf.  
Since Arctic bathymetry is complicated, and shallow waters extend for hundreds of miles, 
there are overlapping territorial claims.  Moreover, the U. S. has signed the UNCLOS, 
but has not yet ratified it.  Arguments for and against ratification are listed in the CSIS 
summary.22  Because of the changing conditions of the Arctic Ocean, the provisions of 
the UNCLOS may be a “moving target.”  For example, circum-Arctic states have much 
more control over ice-covered waters in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) than 
they do over open water.  Some of their control over these waters may melt away along 
with the ice. 
There are tremendous reserves of onshore and offshore oil, gas, and natural resources 
that belong to Russia.  Onshore and near-offshore fields such as Russia’s Pechora basin 
and Ob River basin, Canada’s Mackenzie Delta, and America’s Prudhoe Bay are not in 
dispute, but as Arctic ice retreats, new offshore resources will continue to be discovered.   
The U. S. Arctic contains an estimated 13% of domestic oil reserves, the development of 
which is increasingly vulnerable to accelerated coastal erosion.  Timber and mineral 
resources can be shipped to the Arctic from the Siberian interior using the well-developed 
river transport system that connects the Arctic to centers of Siberian commerce and the 
southern railway that connects to Europe and the Pacific coast.  The changing physical 
conditions in the Arctic Ocean and the high-latitude land areas may create a new “gold 
rush” that has the potential for conflict as well as further environmental impact. 
3.3 Territorial claims 
Boundaries and international laws are not well defined or accepted by all parties, so 
the potential for conflict is high.  There are only five nations with territorial claims in the 
Arctic: Russia, Canada, U. S., Denmark, and Norway.  Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and 
semi-autonomous groups of indigenous peoples also have economic and strategic 
interests.  There are a large number of border disputes of one kind or another currently in 
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the Arctic.  Canada has declared that the now-opening Northwest Passage cannot be 
traversed without passing through its territorial waters, but the U. S. position is that these 
are international waters.  However, Canada’s Arctic Coastline remains undeveloped, 
whereas Russia has operating infrastructure on its Arctic coast and is poised for further 
economic development. 
Russia is the most aggressive of the circum-Arctic nations, and is increasingly 
dependent on its mineral and fuel exports for income.  According to Russian President 
Medvedev, "The Arctic for Russia holds great strategic meaning.  This region is directly 
linked to meeting the long-term challenges of the country and its competitiveness in 
global markets."23  In keeping with that sentiment, Russia is claiming most of the Arctic 
seabed under the United Nations Law of the Sea.  The Russian government asserts that 
the Lomonosov Ridge, which traverses the Arctic Ocean from Siberia to well beyond the 
North Pole, is an extension of the continental shelf and therefore part of Russia’s 
exclusive Extended Economic Zone (EEZ). 
To address these issues, an Arctic Ocean Conference was held in Ilulissat, Greenland 
in May, 2008.24  The conference was organized by Denmark’s foreign minister Stig 
Møller, who cited the need to “fulfill our obligations in the Arctic area until the UN 
decides who will have the right to the sea and the resources in the region” and to “agree 
on the rules and what to do if climate changes make more shipping possible.”  This 
summit resulted in an Ilulissat Declaration: 
"Climate change and the melting of ice have a potential impact on vulnerable 
ecosystems, the livelihoods of local inhabitants and indigenous communities, and the 
potential exploitation of natural resources.  By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean, the five coastal states are 
in a unique position to address these possibilities and challenges." 
 
The declaration also specifically rejected efforts by the international community to 
create laws to govern the use of the Arctic Ocean as an international trust, modeled after 
Antarctica.  The emerging “Arctic Five” clearly intend to control oil, gas and mineral 
exploration, shipping, and environmental regulation, with focus on economic exploitation 
rather than ecological preservation.  This puts the Arctic Five at odds with the European 
Union, which is attempting to exert influence over the future of the Arctic, with stronger 
focus on environmental protection.  It also appears to be at odds with Møller’s statement 
that the UN should make the decisions about use of the sea and resources. 
3.4 International conflict and military operations 
The Ilulissat Declaration is the most recent development and may be the first step in 
diffusing the escalating rhetoric and resolving border claims.  Nevertheless, the potential 
for conflict remains, and the stakes continue to grow along with the area of open Arctic 
waters.  Russia has been expanding its aging nuclear icebreaker fleet, aggressively 
pursuing its claims to the Arctic seabed, and used a deep-submersible submarine in 2007 
to plant its flag on the seabed under the North Pole.  The U. S. Coast Guard has called for 
more icebreakers and is planning new facilities on the Arctic coast of Alaska.  China is 
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maintaining an Arctic research vessel.25  Canada recently announced plans to construct a 
military base and deepwater port adjacent to the Northwest Passage and to build a small 
fleet of boats to patrol the passage where it passes through its claimed territorial waters. 
Territorial disputes are emerging among all five Arctic coastal nations.  Even 
Denmark and Canada have clashed over jurisdiction of tiny Hans Island, a barren and 
uninhabited 1.3 km2 bit of land in the straight between Ellesmere Island and Greenland.   
The dispute is largely symbolic, but has become the most visible focus of Canada’s plan 
to assert sovereignty over its northern territorial islands and waters.  Conflict can be 
precipitated over disagreements over sovereignty, over economic and exploration rights, 
or over freedom of passage.  The military infrastructure is changing in anticipation of 
potential conflict, but this infrastructure is itself vulnerable to accelerating climate 
change.  Some military installations in the Arctic already succumbed to the changing 
climate.  As a highly visible example, three NORAD early-warning radar stations were 
decommissioned last year, at least partially due to coastal erosion and soil instability.26  
3.5 Roads and infrastructure 
Climate change and the anticipated acceleration in permafrost loss have significant 
implications for Arctic infrastructure (Lawrence, et al., 2008).  The ACIA report 
discusses infrastructure issues in detail, and provides a summary of engineering projects 
that may be impacted.  The following paraphrased bullets are extracted from the ACIA 
infrastructure chapter: 
 Northern pipelines (such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and the proposed gas pipeline 
from the North Slope of Alaska) are likely to be affected by frost heave and thaw 
settlement. Slope stability is also likely to be an issue in discontinuous permafrost. 
 The settlement of shallow pile foundations in permafrost could possibly be 
accelerated by temperature increases over the design life of a structure (~20 years).  
 Large tailings disposal facilities might be affected (negatively or positively) by 
climate change, due to the long-term effects on tailings layers.   
 The availability of off-road transportation routes (e.g. ice roads) is likely to decrease 
owing to a reduction in the duration of the freezing season. The effect of a shorter 
freezing season on ice roads has already been observed in Alaska and Canada (this is 
already happening and is limiting drilling in the Arctic). 
 Climate change is likely to reduce ice-cover thickness on bodies of water and the 
resulting ice loading on structures such as bridge piers.  However, until these effects 
are observed, it is unlikely that engineers will incorporate them into the design of 
such structures. 
 The thickness of Arctic sea-ice cover is also decreasing in response to climate 
change, and it is possible that this will affect the design of offshore structures for ice 
loadings, and the design of ice roads used to access structures over landfast ice in 
winter. 
 Precipitation changes are very likely to alter runoff patterns, and possibly the ice–
water balance in the active layer. It is very difficult to assess the potential effects of 
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these changes on structures such as bridges, pipeline river crossings, dikes, or erosion 
protection structures. 
 The stability of open-pit mine walls will possibly be affected where steep slopes in 
permafrost overburden have been exposed for long periods of time. The engineering 
concerns relate to increased thaw depth over time, with consequent increased pore 
pressures in the soil and rock, and resulting loss of strength and pit-wall stability. 
 The cleanup and abandonment of military and industrial facilities (including oil 
production facilities) throughout the Arctic sometimes involves storage of potentially 
hazardous materials in permafrost. There is some chance that permafrost degradation 
associated with climate change will threaten these storage facilities.  
 
There will be enormous economic costs associated with re-engineering, retrofitting, 
and rebuilding Arctic infrastructure to withstand expected climate change.  However, it is 
clear from this list of impacts that the uncertainty is large, and much of the cost will be 
associated with designing infrastructure to withstand large and poorly-defined margins of 
uncertainty.   
3.6 Ecosystems 
Arctic ecosystems are many and varied.  They support large mammals such as polar 
bears, walruses, and seals, as well as numerous resident and migratory birds.  Terrestrial 
ecosystems include boreal forests, Arctic tundra, and polar deserts.  Freshwater 
ecosystems include rivers and streams, lakes and ponds, and wetlands.  Marine 
ecosystems in the Arctic are unique, and the sea ice plays an enormously important role.  
Ice controls the exchange of heat, moisture, and gases at the ocean/atmosphere interface, 
it affects the amount of sunlight that penetrates into the water, and it creates habitat for 
predators and prey both above and below the surface.  There are both shallow and deep 
marine ecosystems.  All are experiencing strong climate-related changes, and some of 
them–such as the remote and little-explored ecosystems of the Ellesmere Island ice 
shelves–are on the verge of disappearing altogether.  The ACIA report has several 
chapters on ecosystem impacts, some of which are considered to be likely or very likely.  
Most of these impacts are already happening and are expected to continue and/or 
accelerate.  Some of the bullets, extracted from the ACIA report, are paraphrased and 
briefly summarized here: 
Arctic tundra and polar desert ecosystems 
 The dominant response of Arctic species may be to migrate rather than adapt. 
 Very long term response may be increased diversity through speciation. 
 Populations may change primarily because of extreme events. 
 Forest and shrubs may invade tundra, reducing albedo and further increasing temperature. 
 Soils may continue warming and drying, but the net affect on carbon is uncertain. 
 Rapid climate changes will very likely increase fire, disease, and pest outbreaks. 
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Freshwater ecosystems 
 Impacts are very uncertain due to complexity and lack of long-term monitoring. 
 Increased winter river flows may increase under-ice habitat. 
 Lower summer water levels of lakes and rivers may affect aquatic habitats. 
 Permafrost thawing may increase nutrient, sediment and carbon loadings. 
 Increased sediments are likely to be harmful to benthic fauna. 
 Lakes are very likely to drain catastrophically due to permafrost thaw. 
 Biodiversity will very likely be affected across most of the Arctic. 
 Microbial decomposition rates are very likely to increase 
 More organic matter and nutrients will very likely lead to greater biological production. 
 Many species will shift their ranges and community compositions. 
 Spawning grounds for cold-water fish are likely to diminish. 
 There will likely be an increase in fish, mammal and bird diseases and parasites. 
 Migration patterns of aquatic mammals and waterfowl are likely to change. 
 Reproductive success is likely to be altered by changes in habitat. 
 
Marine ecosystems 
 Area and intensity of phytoplankton production will increase. 
 Different phytoplankton species composition is favored by mixing depth. 
 Southern range of zooplankton, benthic fauna, and fish species will recede. 
 More adaptable zooplankton species may be favored. 
 Production of shrimp and crab species may decline. 
 Spawning and feeding behavior of fish will change. 
 A mismatch in timing between zooplankton and fish larvae may emerge. 
 Cod, herring, walleye, pollock, and some flatfish may increase and move north. 
 Capelin, polar cod, and Greenland halibut will decline and range will shrink. 
 Marine mammals and seabird distributions will shift poleward. 
 Mammals that depend on ice will suffer dramatic declines. 
 Temperate mammal species will benefit and increase. 
 Seabird production is unpredictable due to unknown changes in food supply. 
 Declines of polar bear, and ringed, harp, hooded, and spotted seals. 
 Increased distribution of harbor seals and grey seals. 
 Possible declines in bowhead, narwhal, grey, and beluga whales. 
 
There are many studies published since the ACIA report showing that many of these 
changes are already taking place.  (Hoste, et al., 2007) have observed losses in microbial 
biomass and other marine ecosystem changes.   Ecosystems that depend on Arctic 
permafrost are being threatened by its rapid degradation (Lawrence, et al., 2008).  Boreal 
forests have already become more vulnerable to insects and wildfires.  Native tundra is 
yielding to invasion of shrublands.  Polar bear populations are declining because they can 
no longer migrate to their den sites on land and reach their prey on the ice.  Polar bears 
are also being observed at sites far inland from the Arctic coast, formerly a rare event.  
Changes in marine ecosystems are having an effect on production of fisheries, which 
have direct economic and geopolitical impacts. 
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3.7 Fisheries 
The Arctic is home to some of the world’s most productive fisheries.  As the ice-sea 
boundary moves northward, the area of ocean open to indigenous and commercial fishing 
will increase.  The change in surface conditions, coupled with increasing air 
temperatures, will have a profound effect on marine ecosystems.  In the Bering Sea, the 
seasonal growth of shallow-water phytoplankton colonies is initiated by the annual retreat 
of sea ice.  Earlier loss of ice leads to later blooms, which form the bottom of the food 
chain for the entire marine ecosystem.  The seabed (benthic) ecosystem dominates the 
cold-water, ice-covered Arctic Ocean, which is associated with high productivity of 
crustaceans and the seabirds and marine mammals that feed on them and one another.  
The water-column (pelagic) ecosystem tends to dominate warmer ice-free waters, but it is 
unclear how the ecosystem balance will adapt to changes in the seasonal timing of ice 
retreat and increased temperature. 
Fisheries researchers suggest that climate change has the potential to change 
geographic distributions of existing fish species, allow new species to establish 
themselves, change the timing of seasonal migrations and spawning, change abundances, 
mortality and growth rates, modify predator-prey and competitor interactions among 
species, in addition to rebalancing the pelagic and benthic communities according to 
fisheries expert Gordon Kruse.27 
The most complete summary of how climate change will impact Arctic fisheries can 
be found in Chapter 13 of the ACIA: “Fisheries and Aquaculture” which includes this 
discussion in the summary: 
“Modeling studies show that it is difficult to simulate and project changes in climate 
resulting from the response to forces that can and have been measured and even 
monitored on a regular basis for considerable periods and on which the models are 
built.  Furthermore, current climate models do not include scenarios for ocean 
temperatures, watermass mixing, upwelling, or other relevant ocean variables such 
as primary and secondary production, on either a global or regional basis.  As 
fisheries typically depend on such variables, any predictions concerning fisheries in 
a changing climate can only be of a very tentative nature.” 
 
The economic and social impact of climate change on fisheries is virtually 
impossible to forecast because of the complexities of the natural systems and the 
associated human response. 
3.8 Indigenous populations 
The rapid loss of Arctic sea ice poses a particularly severe problem for high-latitude 
indigenous populations whose traditional subsistence lifestyles depend on the abundance 
of wildlife and healthy ecosystems that depend on the ice.  These native peoples include 
the Inuit, Aleuts, Athabascans, and Gwich’in of Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, the Sami 
of Scandinavia and Russia, and many smaller native Siberian groups.  Many indigenous 
hunters are dependent on stable and predictable sea ice, which they use every spring to 
get to their whaling sites, and to transport their wildlife harvests home.  For many groups, 
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the subsistence way of life is a central part of the cultural and spiritual heritage that may 
be lost if they are forced to convert their diet to imported foods and participate in a cash 
economy.  Such disruptions in the traditional ways of native people typically lead to 
severe social problems.  Impacts on indigenous populations are reviewed in detail by the 
ACIA. 
To provide one example of impacts and their economic costs, the state of Alaska 
recently allocated funds for projects to boost the protections of some of the state’s 
endangered coastal villages from erosion due to climate change.   According to a 2003 
report by the U. S. General Accountability Office,28 184 of Alaska’s 213 native villages 
are having problems with increased erosion and flooding.  Several villages are becoming 
uninhabitable because the erosion is exacerbated by sinking of the ground due to 
warming and disintegrating permafrost.  For example, the Yupik Eskimo village of 
Newtok is receiving $3.3 million to relocate its 321 residents to a new site on higher 
ground.  Other projects are reinforcing sea walls and other erosion control measures to 
delay relocation of other villages.  Changes in the environment coupled with higher 
energy costs are driving many Alaskan natives to migrate to cities.  The Mayor and 
Schools Superintendent of Anchorage recently sent a letter to the Governor of Alaska 
asking to establish a task force to find ways to deal with this migration.29 
3.9 Sea level rise 
Increasing sea level is the most obvious and dramatic means by which the “Arctic 
tail” can wag the “global dog.”  Many papers have pointed out the vulnerability of 
Greenland ice to a warming climate.  Precipitation rates are projected to increase as a 
consequence of the higher temperature and humidity associated with climate change, but 
ice melting is expected to increase at an even higher rate, leading to net decrease in ice 
volume (IPCC TAR Working Group 1).  (Gregory, et al., 2004) analyzed the effect of all 
the IPCC scenarios and concluded that the Greenland ice sheet is likely to disappear 
during the next 1,000 years, leading to an average sea level rise of seven meters or more.  
At the end of the last glacial period, estimated sea level rise was in excess of 1 meter per 
century for thousands of years. A sea level rise of 7 meters in 1000 years is not 
unprecedented (AR4) and 3-5 meters in a century is not impossible during the most 
abrupt transitions. 
The average global sea level rise during the 20th century was between 10 and 20 cm, 
and mostly due to thermal expansion.  For virtually all of human history, the rate of sea 
level rise had been an order of magnitude slower.  Moreover, ice loss would be 
irreversible on a historical time scale even if global conditions and atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentration were to return to their present level.  This hysteresis in 
thermal response is at least partially due to ice albedo feedback: the land surface is darker 
and absorbs more energy.  It is also at a lower altitude than it was when the ice sheet 
formed, so precipitation and accumulation would be taking place at a higher temperature 
than it did when ice was accumulating, even if the climate were not changing. 
Even when sea level rise is slow, it can be relentless and can–over time–change the 
face of the Earth.  About 20,000 years ago, at the last glacial maximum, sea level was 
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about 120 m lower than it is now.  As the continental ice sheet melted, sea level rose, but 
not at a steady rate.   Most of the rise took place between 15, 000 and 6,000 years ago, 
when it rose at rates in excess 1 meter per century (AR4).  This might be considered a 
“normal” rate of sea level rise during Earth’s warming periods.  This is a long-term 
average, and the shorter-term rate greatly exceeded it at times of rapid ice loss.  For 
example, about 14,000 years ago sea level rose by 3-5 meters per century for four 
centuries in a row–a rate that might seem extreme, but not impossible.  A rapid melting of 
the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets could conceivably lead to such a rate. 
The IPCC AR4 provided sea level rise projections–based on various carbon emission 
scenarios–that range between 18 and 59 cm by the end of the 21st century.  However, 
these projections neglect the possibility of rapid changes in Greenland or Antarctic ice 
flow, and do not include the possibility of runaway feedbacks in the carbon cycle (such as 
the loss of permafrost and methane hydrates).  Ice sheet dynamical processes, permafrost 
deterioration, and methane hydrates are not well enough understood to include in the 
models.  However, climate models do suggest that global temperatures will rise to a level 
that will nearly eliminate the Greenland ice sheet, so sea level rise is a question of rate, 
not of magnitude.  Temperatures in Greenland are expected to reach those of the last 
interglacial period, 125,000 years ago.  Paleooceanographic reconstructions suggest sea 
level was 4-6 meters higher at that time (Rohling, et al., 2007), with some evidence for 
sea-level fluctuations of up to 10 meters around this mean, and average rates of 1.6 
meters per century. 
New constraints on the possible near-term acceleration of sea level (Rahmstorf, 
2007) suggest that it could rise between .5 and 1.4 meters by the end of the 21st century.  
However, this estimate also ignores the possibility of a fundamental shift in the dynamics 
of ice sheet processes.  (Carlson, et al., 2008) point out that with the current greenhouse 
warming, the increase in summer surface air temperatures in the Arctic will be very 
similar to the increase that caused the final collapse of the Laurentide ice sheet, which 
raised sea level by 1.3 meters per century.  According to the lead author of that study, 
“We conclude that we could be grossly underestimating how much the Greenland ice 
sheet could melt by the end of this century."30    
3.10 Climate change risk assessment 
Since projected consequences are based on models that cannot explain the rapid sea 
level increases that happened during warming periods in the past, we believe they are 
overly optimistic in their tendency to produce estimates of sea level rise that are low. 
Conservative engineering and security planning would anticipate the highest-
consequence possibility.  Paleoclimate data imply that the poorly-understood processes of 
ice-sheet dynamics, permafrost loss, and/or methane hydrate destabilization can 
accelerate to their prehistoric high rates that led to sea level rises of up to 5 meters per 
century, suggesting that model uncertainty is grossly underestimated. 
 Sandia is in a particularly good position to contribute to a risk assessment associated 
with climate change based on quantification of margins and uncertainties (QMU) by 
applying the same methodologies developed to ensure the safety, security, and reliability 
 32
of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile.  Implicit in QMU methods is a conservative 
engineering perspective in which the primary focus is on keeping the uncertainty in a 
decision parameter below some acceptable fraction of the margin that describes an 
established requirement for that parameter.   This engineering perspective, as applied to 
climate change, is described in the next section. 
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4.  Probabilistic Risk Assessment:  an Engineering 
Perspective for Climate Change 
The large and growing body of literature on global climate change is mostly written 
from a scientific perspective that focuses on the most probable future.  A scientific 
approach is the most appropriate method for gaining understanding of natural systems by 
applying physically-sound theory, empirical observations, and validated models.  The 
most conservative scientific estimates are those that deviate the least from prior 
expectations.  Scientific conservatism, when applied to climate change, tends to 
downplay the degree of change.   
 For complex, non-deterministic, chaotic systems such as Earth’s climate, reliable 
prediction of the future is not possible.  Climate forecasts are similar to weather forecasts 
in that, at best, they can only be probabilistic in nature.  However, climate and weather 
have very different time scales, and climate projections have a significant uncertainty due 
to lack of understanding.  As Mark Twain said, “climate is what we expect, weather is 
what we get.” Whereas long-term comparisons can be made between weather forecasts 
and observations, the climate future unfolds too slowly for such statistical validation.  
The best that climate scientists can do is to generate probability distribution functions 
which encapsulate the best estimate of the future, plus some bounds on its uncertainty.   
From a scientific perspective, the lower bound on expected climate change is considered 
to be the conservative estimate. 
The IPCC reports present climate forecasts as assessments of the most probable 
future.  For example, the AR4 provides a graph of “warming by 2090-2099 relative to 
1980-1999 for non-mitigation scenarios” in terms of “best estimate and likely ranges of 
warming”.  “Likely” is defined by the AR4 as an outcome that occurs with a probability 
of more than 66%.  Thus, the ranges provided in Fig. 4.1 are of the most interest 
scientifically because they are the most probable.   
 
Figure 4.1.  Estimated temperature bands for various emissions scenarios from 
IPCC AR4 Synthesis Report.  Dots and bars show best estimates and “likely” 
ranges of warming for the 2090s relative to the 1980s and 1990s. 
National security concerns, in contrast to science, are focused on the high-risk 
occurrences.  For security applications—as for engineering—it is the low-probability but 
high-consequence set of events that must be the primary focus of planning and mitigation 
efforts.  Engineers include significant margins into their designs to account for low-
probability occurrences.  For example, structures are designed for 100-year weather 
events and highest loads in the unlikeliest combinations that may have a low probability 
of ever occurring over the lifetime of the bridge.  Bridge designs must consider the non-
 34
zero probability that several fully-loaded tractor-trailer rigs could simultaneously be 
stalled in traffic during a severe winter storm.  Neglecting the tail of the probability 
distribution of traffic and weather can lead to catastrophic consequences.  Likewise, 
because of the extreme consequences associated with any nuclear weapon failure, 
extreme tolerances are imposed for nuclear weapons engineering.   
Few events can have consequences that would exceed those of an accidental nuclear 
explosion.  Two occurrences that can lead to even greater catastrophe are 1) impact by a 
large asteroid, and 2) extreme and abrupt global climate change.  Both of these 
possibilities can be described as tails of probability distributions, and neither can be ruled 
out by the science.  When the consequences include global collapse of civilization, a 
probability of a few percent is not insignificant.  Conceptually, the total risk from climate 
change can be estimated the same way as the total risk from asteroids: by multiplying the 
likelihood derived from a probability distribution by the magnitude of the consequences, 
and summing.  The asteroid-threat literature makes use of this method (Chapman and 
Morrison, 1994), and these estimates are well established and accepted by a community 
that is dominated by engineers and national security specialists.  By contrast, the climate-
change literature, such as the IPCC AR4, is focused on the most probable scenarios.  The 
climate change community is dominated by scientists who are most interested in the 
likeliest future as opposed to the most consequential.  As climate change becomes 
increasingly recognized as a national security issue, we expect a more engineering-
oriented risk approach to emerge, which will require more emphasis on uncertainty 
quantification, especially at the high end of the range of the projections. 
There is ongoing research to formally quantify the uncertainty in the equilibrium 
temperature due radiative forcing equivalent to doubled CO2 (likely before the end of 
the 21st century).  Some assessments of this climate sensitivity result in the generation 
of probability density functions rather than the simple “likelihood bounds” as 
provided by the IPCC (Fig. 4.1).  These studies consistently show that the high-end 
sensitivities have a significant probability.  For example, (Forest, et al., 2002) give a 
5-to-95% confidence interval of 1.4 to 7.7 °C climate sensitivity.  This is not 
inconsistent with the IPCC AR4 17-to-83% confidence interval of 2 to 4.5 °C, and 
suggests that distribution is strongly skewed with a sharp cutoff at the low end and a 
fat tail at the high end.  The sharp low-end cutoff is not unexpected, because the best 
understood feedbacks are strongly positive (e.g. water vapor) and any perfectly-
canceling negative feedback would need to cancel not only the forcing but also the 
large positive feedbacks.    
(Murphy, et al., 2004) have used the ensemble method in a “perturbed physics” 
method which systematically varies 29 model parameters to determine a probability 
distribution function that has a 5% to 95% range of 2.4°C to 5.4 °C, with a median of 
3.5°C and a “most probable” value of 3.2°C (Fig.4.2).  This is probably the most 
sophisticated analysis to date because it makes use of more advanced models and is 
consistent with the transient effects of climate change and forcing.  Processes that 
determine climate sensitivity are varied systematically and uncertainties are weighted 
according to an objective index.  However, it still does not account for lack-of-
knowledge epistemic uncertainties, and still does not make use of a fully coupled 
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ocean model.   Nevertheless, we have chosen to use the Murphy et al. probability 
distribution function to illustrate the importance of the oft-neglected high-end tail to 
estimate the climate change threat. 
 
Figure 4.2.  Using the probability distribution of Murphy et al. (red) a 
cumulative probability is derived (blue).  The consequence curve (green) 
assumes an exponential increase of fatalities from the current WHO estimate at 
0.8 °C to a global extinction event at 20 °C. 
Human consequences associated with wars, disease, and natural disasters are 
typically measured in fatalities, or in fatalities per year for ongoing losses.  Risk 
assessments result in estimates of expected deaths per year associated with the risk being 
quantified.  For climate change, this is a difficult task because there is no way to validate 
the consequences of climate change that has not yet occurred.  Nevertheless, a baseline 
has been established by the World Health Organization31  which estimated in 2005 that 
150,000 deaths per year are currently attributable to anthropogenic climate change.  We 
assert that a global catastrophe threshold exists, above which civilization collapses and a 
significant fraction of the Earth’s population perishes.  This uncontroversial claim is the 
basis for the risk estimates associated climate change caused by asteroid impacts 
(Chapman and Morrison, 1994).  The global catastrophe threshold for impacts is assumed 
to be that for which dust injected into the stratosphere would depress land temperatures 
by “several to perhaps 10 °C” for more for a period of months (Covey, et al., 1990) to as 
long as a year (Toon, et al., 1995), leading to a “nuclear winter” agricultural disaster that 
could cause global economic, social, and political structures to fail (Turco, et al., 1991).  
Climate change due to an asteroid impact is assumed to be rapid, but transient, because it 
is due to forcing by short-lived atmospheric components (dust) as opposed to long-lived 
greenhouse gases such as CO2.  For sake of argument, we adopt the same catastrophe 
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threshold of “several to perhaps 10 °C or more” for climate sensitivity.  The 
anthropogenic temperature change is in the opposite direction, and longer-lasting than for 
an impact, but is reasonable to suggest that the magnitude is similar.  The estimated 
chance of a globally catastrophic impact by a >1.5 km diameter asteroid in the next 
century (accounting for Earth-crossing asteroids yet to be discovered) is less than one in 
10,000.  Published probabilities for anthropogenic climate change suggest the chances of 
a greenhouse gas induced global catastrophe are hundreds of times greater. 
 
Figure 4.3.  The low range of the consequence curve (green) is the same as for 
Fig. 4.2, but assumes that 6.5 °C causes a global environmental collapse that kills 
about ¼ of the world’s population over 25 years. 
The total risk can be calculated by dividing the climate sensitivity probability 
distribution into bins, multiplying the relative probability of each bin by the 
consequences (in fatalities/year) and integrating.  It is instructive to illustrate the results 
with a few “back-of-the-envelope” calculations using assumed consequence curves 
represented by the descriptions in Table 4.1.  In all cases, the WHO estimate of current 
climate-change fatalities/year of 150,000 is assumed at 0.8 °C, and the entire population 
of the Earth is assumed to die immediately (6·109deaths/year) for DT2x = 20 °C.   For 
Case 1, and for the other three cases below their threshold, the fatality rate was 
interpolated exponentially between these two end values.  The threshold fatality rate was 
assumed to be 6·107 deaths/year, which would lead to a loss of about 25% of the world’s 
present population in 25 years, consistent with the catastrophe threshold defined for the 
impact threat.  Since these curves are constructed for illustration purposes, the nature of 
the curves is more important than their quantitative properties. 
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Table 4.1 Risk as a function of threshold 
Case 
 
Description Threshold sensitivity Risk (deaths/year) 
1 
 
Exponential No threshold 820 thousand 
2 
 
Low threshold 3.5 °C 35 million 
3 
 
Middle threshold 5.0 °C 5.8 million 
4 
 
High threshold 6.5 °C 1.4 million 
 
To perform the integrations, we digitized the probability distribution function from 
Figure 3 of (Murphy, et al., 2004) and extrapolated smoothly as it entered the high-end 
tail.  The consequence curves and resulting threat curves for cases 1 and 4 are shown in 
Figs. 4.2 and 4.3.   It is the area under the threat curve that is equal to the expected loss of 
life for a given assumed consequence function, and in all cases these are dominated by 
the high-end tail, as expected.  Significantly, assumptions of global catastrophe that are 
not significantly different from those assumed for the asteroid threat lead to a total 
climate change risk of millions/year (Table 4.1) as opposed the current best estimate of 
80 deaths/year from the asteroid hazard (Harris, 2008).  These examples also demonstrate 
our argument that the climate sensitivity probability distribution functions are not 
symmetric in terms of their contribution to the total risk.  From a security perspective, it 
is much more important to quantify the high-end (right-hand side in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3) tail 
than it is to determine the mean or most probable climate sensitivity.  Unfortunately, it is 
the high-end tail that is least constrained by the models, and the least emphasized in the 
scientific literature.  
This concept is generalized and illustrated schematically in Figure 4.4, taken from 
the Report for the IPCC Workshop on Describing Scientific Uncertainties in Climate 
Change to Support Analysis of Risk and Options (Manning et al., 2004)32.  An idealized 
graph of probability, consequence, and risk is shown.  The horizontal axis represents a 
magnitude of change (which could be global average surface temperature anomaly, sea 
ice loss, or some other parameter that has consequences for humans).  The black curve is 
a probability distribution for the change, and the red curve represents some measurement 
of consequences associated with the change (which could be numbers of fatalities, dollars 
required to repair damage, or some other quantifiable loss).  The product of these two 
curves results in the blue risk curve.  The integrated area under the blue curve is the total 
risk, which is a quantitative assessment of the full spectrum of possible outcomes.  The 
left-hand panel shows a case where the consequences are a smoothly increasing function 
of the change, demonstrating how important the upper uncertainty can be for total risk 
assessment.   The right-hand panel represents the case of a consequence threshold, for 
which the upper uncertainty is amplified.  According to the Workshop Report, “This 
perspective shows that when faced with uncertainty it is not sufficient to identify only a 
most likely outcome to the exclusion of other perhaps less likely but more consequential 
outcomes”.  
 38
 We suggest that a conservative engineering approach is needed to properly quantify 
the climate change threat, which requires stronger focus on the high-consequence, 
“catastrophic climate change” tail in the distribution of possible future climate states.  
Moreover, early-warning systems must be developed that are capable of identifying the 
onset of unexpected climate change and anticipating its evolution so that consequences 
can be minimized. 
An example germane to security consequences of Arctic climate change is illustrated 
in Fig. 4.4, which is based on Fig. 1 of (Stroeve, et al., 2007).  It is a plot of observed 
Arctic September sea ice extent (red) together with 13 IPCC AR4 climate model 
predictions.  The mean of the climate models are shown as a solid black line, and the 
standard deviations are the dotted black lines.  We have added the 2007 and 2008 ice 
minima that have occurred since this figure was originally published.  The actual ice loss 
has exceeded not only the standard deviation of the ensemble of forecasts, but has gone 
beyond the most extreme of individual models.  
For illustration purposes, consider what might have been reasonable security 
questions for decision makers to ask several years ago, perhaps to allocate funding for 
vessels used to patrol the opening Northwest passage.  
 
Figure 4.4.  Schematic of probability, consequence and risk, from the IPCC Workshop 
Report on Uncertainty and Risk (Manning, et al., 2004). 
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1. What is the best estimate based on IPCC climate change models, for the first year 
that Arctic sea ice will diminish below 4.3 million km2? 
2. What is the uncertainty in this estimate? 
Based only on model information, a reasonable approach would have been to base 
the estimate and uncertainty quantification on a statistical analysis of the projections, 
leading to a best estimate of 2052 for the year to prepare for, likely to be no sooner than 
2032 and no later than 2095.  However, this estimate ignores the lack-of-understanding 
component in the uncertainty.  It is possible that sea ice, and its interaction with the 
climate system, is poorly modeled.  It is exceedingly difficult to quantify this contribution 
to uncertainty and engineering conservatism requires that it be assumed for high-
consequence planning to be large and the Arctic could become seasonally ice free much 
sooner than expected. 
The conservative estimate from a scientific perspective would have been the later 
date, because the Arctic Oscillation is poorly understood, the models may have 
Sep 3 2008 
4.85 M km2 
BE-σ = 2032 
BE = 2052 
BE+σ = 2095 
Sep 2007 
Minimum 
4.28 M km2 
BE + U 
Observed 
Conservative 
engineering Conservative 
science
Observed = 2007
Figure 4.5.  Observed September Arctic sea ice extent (red) and predictions, based on 
Figure 1 of (Stroeve, et al., 2007).   Concepts of best estimate, uncertainty, conservative 
engineering, and conservative science are illustrated.  These models were overly 
conservative from the perspective of science, and insufficiently conservative from the 
perspectives of engineering and security, on which planning is based. 
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insufficient resolution for regional projections, and a regression to the long-term mean 
cannot be ruled out.  Engineering conservatism, however, forces us to consider the 
possibility that we do not understand the positive feedbacks and potential for cascading 
and mutual reinforcing failures of climate stability.  The conservative estimate for 
security considerations would have been to prepare for this loss before 2032.  
Because planning for national security requires emphasis on high-consequence 
scenarios, scientifically-conservative models that focus on best estimates are insufficient.  
There is an urgent and growing need for improved uncertainty quantification to enable 
better estimates of the high-consequence tails in the probability distribution functions of 
future climate change.  The following section recognizes that there is a non-zero 
probability of high-consequence changes, and discusses the implications of such 
scenarios for national security without detailed quantification of their likelihood.  
However, we do not consider any of the scenarios to be highly unlikely. 
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5. Arctic Climate Scenarios and Implications for 
National Security 
This section demonstrates a process for Arctic climate scenario development and 
extension of the results to problems of national security.  To fit within the scope and 
resources of this study, we limited the bases of the scenarios and the extent to which 
climate impacts were investigated.  In that respect, this section is a survey of the problem 
and demonstration of a method for more detailed investigations.  The list of national 
security implications for each scenario should be explored and developed further in 
succeeding studies. 
5.1 Arctic scenario development  
Scenarios are stories about the future.  They are hypothetical chains of events that 
lead from the present to an uncertain future.  Scenarios and narratives built from 
scenarios are one means to plan for contingencies and possible mitigation actions for a 
range of possible futures.  The use of scenarios implicitly acknowledges conservative 
engineering risk planning by recognizing that high-consequence events may have non-
zero probability, without attempting to quantify the likelihood. 
We used recommendations from Peter Schwartz, Art of the Long View, as well as 
recommendations from the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment – Scientific Report 
(ACIA), to develop general Arctic climate scenarios for this study.  Methods used to 
build these scenarios are listed in Appendix A: Arctic Climate Scenarios Development 
and Selection.   
For the purposes of this study, we developed Arctic Climate Scenarios that impact 
Sandia’s mission areas.  Peter Schwartz recommends that crucial uncertainties be 
identified and used as bases, like dimensions of a multi-dimensional vector or axes of a 
spatial representation.  Scenarios can be built from two or more of these uncertainty 
dimensions.  Scenario “stories” are then developed.  For this study, we concentrated on 
just two crucial uncertainties.  The two dimensions of uncertainty that we used for this 
study are:  
1. Arctic climate and weather; 
2. Time scale or rate of change. 
There are other crucial uncertainties–energy futures and energy economics for 
example–which are clearly important to Sandia’s interest and could be added to future 
studies.  Additional dimensions of uncertainty that could be used for future scenario 
developments include: 
1. Duration of the change. 
2. Future energy costs. 
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Several specific climate events of interest were identified in the literature in advance 
of our scenario development.  We used the area described by climate and rate-of-change 
to examine the relationship among scenarios and also to “discover” new climate scenarios 
with significant consequences.  A scenario map can provide insight into transitions 
between climate states and possible cascading events. 
We used the first two axes of uncertainty mentioned above, climate and rate-of-
change, to build a scenario map that projected consequences and possible human 
response.  
The Arctic climate events of interest that we identified in advance are: 
 Ice-free Arctic summers:  Shipping, resources, Arctic ports in Siberia, oil and gas, 
minerals; 
 Severe storms in circum-Arctic nations.  Radically altered hydrological cycle and 
surface water locations that completely changes storm patterns and makes some 
potential ports or bases inaccessible;  
 Accelerated ice loss from Greenland, sea level rise, icebergs; 
 Rapid permafrost thaw; 
 Ecological collapse; 
 “Arctic tail wagging the global dog” by alteration of circulation,  and changing 
meridional temperature gradient, changes in climate throughout the northern 
hemisphere is accelerated; 
 Cascading climate-related events and a failure of climate stability.  
 
5.2 Scenarios, probability, “long-tail” events, and “Black Swans” 
The two literature sources we used for scenarios and methods contradicted each 
other regarding use of scenarios that are unlikely or implausible.  In addition to likely 
scenarios, we chose to include scenarios that currently seem less likely in light of recent 
climate trends and forecasts from climate modeling efforts, such as the ensemble 
modeling runs of the IPCC reports.  We include these less likely scenarios so that a full 
range of possible future climates can be considered in this scenario development. 
According to the IPCC AR4 guidance notes for addressing uncertainty, an “unlikely” 
scenario is one that has a probability of less than 33% of occurring.  High-consequence 
engineering assessments for nuclear weapons safety and the threat of asteroid impacts are 
concerned with occurrences that are many orders of magnitude less probable, so our “less 
likely” scenarios are actually much more likely than events that are typically considered 
by engineers.  We concentrated on climate scenarios and impacts over roughly the next 
four to five decades to mid-21st century.  
There are several compelling reasons to include low-probability events in scenario 
developments.  Successful scenario-building exercises in the past have demonstrated that 
future events that may appear to be improbable are essential to cover the full range of 
possible futures.  For example, Royal Dutch Shell included events and oil prices that 
seemed unlikely at the time to successfully anticipate market events like the oil shocks of 
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the 1970’s.  As part of this planning process, leading signposts and indicators can be 
identified and monitored to provide early warnings of unlikely conditions or states. 
Another reason to include low-probability scenarios in planning exercises is the 
demonstrated importance of “long-tail” events that result from power-law distributions 
(Taleb, 2007).  Power law distributions can be used to accurately describe many 
important geophysical, financial, computer science, and socio-economic processes.  The 
frequency and magnitudes of hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes, for example, are 
well-represented by power law distributions.  Hence, low-probability events are in fact 
far more probable than would be anticipated by the commonly-assumed bell-shaped 
probability distribution–often many orders of magnitude more probable.  Many systems 
that are considered to be complex (rather than just complicated) are well-represented by 
power law distributions. 
In practice, it is difficult to perform risk analyses for processes or systems that are 
described by power laws.  There are rarely sufficient numbers of historical cases to 
provide information on events “in the tail.”  These events are referred to in the recent 
literature as “Black Swans” (Taleb, 2007). 
Scenario development, as advocated by Peter Schwartz, requires a significant 
investment of time and should, ideally, include representatives from stakeholder groups 
across an organization (see Appendix A).  We develop four scenarios can serve as the 
first steps toward more detailed scenarios that could be included in a follow-on study.  
Our scenarios will be described as four domains in a space defined on one axis by degree 
of physical environmental change, and on the other axis by the speed of change.  We 
begin by defining five cases of change in the physical environment.  To avoid confusion, 
we adopt the term “case” to describe the set of different possibilities for the future 
physical environment, and “scenario” for the consequences with national security 
impacts.  We postulate the four scenarios and for clarity in the descriptions we use 
language that treats them as axiomatically true. 
5.3. Physical environment: climate and weather 
The five physical environment cases that we considered as the basis for scenario 
development are: 
1. Surprising Reversal: The Arctic region doesn’t follow current global trends.  Instead, 
the Arctic gets colder.  We consider this to be very unlikely. 
 
2. Back to the Holocene: Natural climate variability in the Arctic dominates over the next 
four decades.  We do not think this is likely.   
 
3. Unpredictable Variation: Climate variability increases along with more extreme 
weather.  This is a likely short term (a few decades) projection. 
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4. Steady Climate Deterioration: An emissions-driven range of IPCC scenarios leads   
current climate trends to continue up to a tipping point.  This is the most likely short or 
long-term expectation. 
 
5. Abrupt Collapse and Chaos: Climate changes abruptly with rapid warming, and earlier-
than-expected retreat of summer sea ice, past the point of no return.  We believe the 
likelihood of this is highly dependent on the rate of future greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
5.4 Five possible futures for the physical environment and Arctic 
climate cases 
1. Surprising Reversal: The Arctic gets colder. 
 
While current climate trends measured at land stations north of 60° N indicate a 
warming trend of about 0.09° C per decade over the last century (ACIA report, Ch.2), 
this case builds on the premise that the Arctic region will enter a cooling period similar to 
the one that occurred in the middle of the 20th century.  This cooling period might result 
from a persistent positive phase of the Arctic Oscillation.  The Arctic Oscillation is in a 
positive phase when higher atmospheric pressures exist in mid-latitudes with lower 
pressures in the Arctic, resulting in surface temperatures in Greenland and Newfoundland 
as well as Arctic stratospheric temperatures that are colder than the long-term average.  
Arctic temperatures can be influenced by other high-latitude oscillations including the 
Pacific Decadal and North Atlantic Oscillations.  Such a cooling could also be caused by 
an unexpected increase in reflective aerosols from a series of volcanic eruptions, higher 
rates of forest burning, new sources of air pollution from changes in patterns of fossil fuel 
consumption, or a slight decrease in solar output as has occurred in the past.  Changes in 
solar activity and aerosols are associated with the cold period known as the Maunder 
Minimum (Hidore and Oliver, 1993). 
While we do not believe an extended reversal to an Arctic cold period is likely given 
recent trends, we include this case for the sake of a complete range in our scenario 
development to include lower-probability events.  This unlikely scenario has relatively 
low consequences compared to the others. 
2. Back to the Holocene: Natural climate variability dominates. 
 
Case 2 projects that, as events unfold over the next four decades, changes in climate 
will be bounded by those of the last ten thousand years.  The last ten millennia in the 
current inter-glacial period have seen an unusually stable climate when compared to the 
long-term record.  This case does not appear likely given very recent atmospheric trends, 
but could conceivably emerge if the low-end of emissions scenarios and climate 
sensitivity estimates turn out to be correct.  We include it for the purpose of building a set 
of scenarios that include low probability cases.  This case includes the possibility that 
climate change occurs at a slower pace than expected and is the least consequential of all 
cases we considered, but is not likely. 
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3. Unpredictable Variation:  Increased climate variability; more extreme weather.  
 
This case projects more intense and more frequent Arctic storms.  Late-forming land-
fast ice leaves coastal zones vulnerable to storm surge and erosion.  Higher sea surface 
temperatures at mid-latitudes are believed to increase the intensity of storms (Curry, et 
al., 2006; Emanuel, et al., 2008; Holland and Webster, 2007).  An increase in extreme 
weather is forecast by IPCC model ensembles.  In this scenario, past patterns of weather 
do not continue and are replaced by a climate that is highly variable and unpredictable.  
Precipitation events in the Unpredictable Variation Case are unprecedented with snow 
and rain amounts that are immense.  Some villages, ports, and industrial facilities in and 
near the Arctic become uninhabitable or unusable.  Planning and capital investment and 
infrastructure for Arctic ventures become increasingly difficult because nobody knows 
what the near-term future environment will be like.  We consider this case to be relatively 
likely, with high regional consequences. 
4. Steady Climate Deterioration:  Climate trends continue to a tipping point. 
 
Climate trends over the next four decades fall within the range forecast by IPCC 
models.  As expected, Arctic temperature increases are significantly higher than average 
global increases.  We consider this to be the most likely scenario.  Temperature increases 
are dependent on greenhouse gas emission scenarios.  This scenario has high global 
consequences and extremely high regional consequences. 
Changes in surface air temperature north of 60º N between the 1981–2000 baseline 
and 2100 as projected by the five ACIA-designated models forced with the A2 and B2 
emissions scenarios (from ACIA).  The Arctic Ocean becomes ice-free in the summer, 
and stays ice-free for a longer period of time every year.  Coastal erosion becomes more 
severe, permafrost deterioration accelerates, and the area of deterioration increases 
rapidly.  Melting of the Greenland ice sheet accelerates and sea level begins rising at a 
rate of 1-2 cm per year.  The discharge of freshwater from Siberian and North American 
rivers into the Arctic increases greatly.  Land and marine ecosystems change rapidly.  
Large areas of tundra are replaced by shrub land and forests grow northward.  Fisheries 
change and move.  Many large mammals, including polar bears, suffer population 
collapses.  Many fish and bird species go extinct.   
5.  Abrupt Change:  Rapid warming and melting; past the point of no return. 
Climate trends that are forecast by the ensemble of models run for the IPCC report 
may prove to underestimate change.  In the “Abrupt Change” case, sea-ice modelers 
including Wieslaw Maslowski (Naval Postgraduate School) and Mark Serreze (NSIDC) 
prove to be correct in their suggestion that that the Arctic will be seasonally free of ice by 
the summer of 2015 or sooner.  The darker Arctic Ocean and rapidly-warming tundra 
contribute to positive feedbacks in Arctic climate.  Glacial melt and increased river runoff 
raise sea levels and modify ocean circulation.  Warming tundra releases greater amounts 
of greenhouse gases, methane in particular.  There is a possibility that this could lead to a 
runaway greenhouse effect, with a hydrological cycle that would completely alter the 
circulation patterns of the ocean and atmosphere.  This change in the hydrologic cycle 
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might create deserts in agricultural regions, cause the collapse of the Greenland and West 
Antarctic ice sheets, and make entire countries incapable of supporting their present 
populations.  Moreover, the changes would continue in a way that weather is no longer 
stable or predictable anywhere.  This is the climate change “doomsday” scenario, with 
extremely high consequences for the Arctic region and for the rest of the world. 
5.5 Rates of climate change:  expected, severe, and catastrophic  
 The three categories for rates of climate change used in the CSIS-CNAS Report, 
(Campbell, et al., 2007), can be used to describe anticipated rates of climate change in the 
Arctic.   The following scenarios describe global temperatures, which may be amplified 
by a factor of up to 3.5 in Arctic land surfaces (Lawrence, et al., 2008). 
 
Expected (CNAS Case 1): Moderate, 1-2 °C over the next 30 years. 
In this case, Arctic climate change occurs at the rate expected by the ACIA and IPCC 
reports.  We take that to be the baseline or moderate case as did the CSIS-CNAS report, 
which quantified this rate as follows:  “The expected climate change scenario considered 
in this report, with an average global temperature increase of 1.3°C by 2040, can be 
reasonably taken as a basis for national planning.”  This would correspond to increases of 
as much as 4.5° C in some areas of the Arctic. 
 
Severe (CNAS Case 2): Fast and Severe, 2-4° C over the next 30 years. 
In the case of severe climate change, corresponding to an average increase in global 
temperature of 2.6°C by 2040, massive nonlinear events in the global environment give 
rise to massive nonlinear societal events.  Increases in some parts of the Arctic could 
exceed 9° C. 
 
Catastrophic (CNAS Case 3): Abrupt and Catastrophic, 4-6° C over the next century. 
The catastrophic scenario, with average global temperatures increasing more than 3° C  
by 2040 and as much as 5.6° C by  2100.  
 
5.6 An Arctic Climate Scenario Map 
In order to develop specific scenarios, we plotted the five cases for physical 
environments against the three possible rates of change discussed in the previous section.  
In the resulting two-dimensional space, we identified regions of climate change impacts 
and consequences as scenarios.  Four major scenarios emerged as congruent areas on this 
map. 
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Figure 5.1. A Map of Arctic Climate Scenarios 
5.7 Arctic climate change scenarios 
5.7.1 Scenario 1: Gradual climate change, manageable adaptations  
The Scenario Story: “Manageable Adaptations” 
 
This scenario is described by the first region in the Arctic climate scenario map near 
the origin.  Physical changes may be a surprising reversal of expected trends, the steady 
climate change currently forecast by many including the IPCC report, or an equally 
surprising dominance of natural variation.  In all physical cases in this scenario, the 
change is relatively slow and adaptation is manageable. 
In Arctic regions, this scenario translates to continued but slow changes in 
permafrost, sea ice extent, and coastal erosion.  Adaptation is manageable since we 
assumed that energy costs do not force imposition of hard (or impossible) choices in 
infrastructure.   
In this scenario, better understanding and measurements of the critical climate 
feedback processes will be essential.  These feedback processes are surface reflectivity, 
ocean circulation, and greenhouse gas emissions.  
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Surface reflectivity changes will occur with changes in sea ice extent (ice vs. a dark 
ocean), snow cover (snow vs. tundra), forest extent, and soot deposits from sources 
outside the Arctic.  Ocean circulation changes will occur with changes in thermohaline 
circulation caused by changes in sea ice, glacial ice, and river flows into the Arctic. 
Greenhouse gas emissions, as described in an earlier section, are projected to continue 
increase rapidly, in line with current IPCC emission scenarios and with expected changes 
in permafrost and methane-trapping tundra. 
Two of the Arctic climate events that we identified prior to our scenarios 
development are possible under this scenario.  They are: 
 Ice-free Arctic summers:  Shipping, resources, Arctic ports in Siberia, oil and gas, 
minerals, and 
 Accelerated ice loss from Greenland, sea level rise, increased numbers of 
icebergs. 
 
National Security Implications: 
 
In this scenario, changes caused by climate change in the Arctic will either reverse or 
will occur at a pace that is sufficiently slow to make them manageable.  The race to claim 
and develop Arctic energy resources will continue even if the current warming trend 
slows or reverses.  International agreement on a revised Law of the Sea will likely be 
possible.  If changes continue, retreating sea ice will open new sea routes and allow 
increased access to national borders, such as the Alaskan coast, that were formerly 
protected by land-fast ice. 
From the CNAS report 
“National security implications include: heightened internal and cross-border 
tensions caused by large-scale migrations; conflict sparked by resource scarcity, 
particularly in the weak and failing states of Africa; increased disease proliferation, 
which will have economic consequences; and some geopolitical reordering as 
nations adjust to shifts in resources and prevalence of disease.  Across the board, the 
ways in which societies react to climate change will refract through underlying 
social, political, and economic factors.” 
Leading Indicators and Signposts for this Scenario: 
 
The geophysical equivalents of “canaries in the coal mine” will provide early indicators 
of change. These include: 
 
 Arctic sea ice volume and extent; 
 Glacial extents; 
 Greenland ice sheet volume; 
 Permafrost extent and depths; 
 Ocean salinity and circulation, particularly at high latitudes. 
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Science and Technology Challenges for Sandia: 
 
 Long-term monitoring of key indicators  and resources to better monitor key 
indicators including satellite sensors and unmanned aerial and terrestrial vehicles; 
 Better understanding of critical Arctic climate feedback processes and 
sensitivities; 
 Better climate models including regional climate models and Arctic systems 
models that include socio-economic impacts. 
 
5.7.2 Scenario 2: Gradual changes with sudden shocks, extreme weather 
events, frequent conflicts involving energy resource ownership. 
The Scenario Story: “Weather Spikes, Climate Shocks” 
 
Climate spikes characterize this scenario.  The physical basis for this scenario is the 
hypothesis that warmer surface temperatures can increase the intensity of storm events. 
Periods of rapid climate variation are evident in paleoclimate records. 
In this scenario, coastal erosion and damage to infrastructure are significant.  Late-
summer or autumn storms that strike ice-free shorelines will damage energy, defense, and 
other critical infrastructure.  Large variation in precipitation and river flow will have 
large impacts on human and animal populations, forest extent, and may alter ocean 
circulations. 
National Security Implications: 
A primary driver in this scenario is the uncertainty regarding the design requirements 
for infrastructure.  The criteria for the “hundred-year storm” change in this scenario.  
Existing infrastructure is inadequate to handle the increasing numbers of severe storms.  
New infrastructure is significantly more expensive. 
In this scenario, intense Arctic storms will surge past ice-free coastlines on a 
frequent basis.  Storm surge will accelerate coastal erosion.  Energy and defense 
infrastructure will be vulnerable to storm damage or will require expensive modification. 
Since the permafrost that supports much of this infrastructure in the Arctic is 
thawing, infrastructure vulnerability is increasing with time.   
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Leading Indicators and Signposts for this Scenario: 
 
 Number and frequency of Arctic storm events; 
 Observed changes in key climate parameters and statistical weather information; 
 Physical observations of Arctic climate feedback processes and comparison to 
regional-scale models; 
 Changes in weather patterns from radically-altered hydrological cycle completely 
changes storm patterns and make some potential ports or bases inaccessible.   
 
Science and Technology Challenges for Sandia: 
 
 High-resolution monitoring of key areas using satellites, airborne sensors, 
unmanned aerial vehicles; 
 Improved weather forecasts and emergency response for the Arctic region; 
 Better integration of synoptic scale models (Weather Research and Forecasting 
Model) with regional and global climate models; 
 Capability to model extreme weather events, uncertainty quantification for these 
events, and incorporate into climate modeling. 
 
5.7.3 Scenario 3: Toward a climate threshold--rapid climate change and 
cascading events advancing toward a climate tipping point  
The Scenario Story: “On the Brink” 
 
A current credible estimate of the amount of atmospheric greenhouse gas in carbon 
dioxide equivalent that is required to exceed a stability threshold or tipping point is 500 
ppm.  There remain large uncertainties in this estimate and conservative engineering risk 
assessment would assume it could be significantly lower.  The amount of time required to 
reach that point depends on future greenhouse gas emissions, estimated through emission 
scenarios for the IPCC report.  The A2 and B2 emission scenarios used in the Arctic 
Climate Impacts Assessment report correspond to 500 ppm CO2 equivalent by dates 
between 2040 and 2060.  Beyond this estimated “tipping point,” one anticipates the 
possibility of runaway greenhouse gas concentrations and resulting negative 
consequences. 
A recent article in the New York Times (Revkin, Sept 26, 2008)33 notes that carbon 
emissions appear to be accelerating. 
 “Overnight the Global Carbon Project, a network of scientists tracking emissions of 
carbon dioxide, released its latest update, and it shows that emissions are 
accelerating and are close to the highest scenarios considered by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change last year. 
Seth Borenstein of The Associated Press has written a summary of the carbon dioxide 
findings, with some input from experts who express surprise that a slowing of 
economic growth in some places hasn’t blunted the growth in CO2 output. 
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More than half of global emissions, which totaled more than 34 billion tons of CO2 in 
2007, are now from developing countries, the report said.  Their dominance reflects 
explosive growth in the burning of coal and manufacturing cement, another big 
source of the heat-trapping gas.  
The project scientists also said that the absorptive power of oceans, forests, and 
other “sinks” for carbon dioxide, which typically suck in more than half of the gas 
emitted each year, has not kept pace with the rising emissions.  In 2007, the report 
said, these sinks took in 54 percent of the emissions, but that is a drop of 3 percent 
from the long-term average rate from 1959 to 2000.  
In a news release from the Global Carbon Project, Corinne Le Quéré from British 
Antarctic Survey and the University of East Anglia said that drop in the efficacy of 
the carbon sinks could mean even more warming in the end.  ‘If this trend continues 
and the natural sinks weaken, we are on track towards the highest projections of 
climate change,’ Dr. Le Quéré said.” 
In his recent book Six Degrees, Mark Lynas surveyed the current science literature 
on climate change and summarized changes that could be expected based on the average 
global temperature increase. Table 4.1 below, from Six Degrees, lists expected average 
global temperature increases with CO2 emissions. Table 4.2 is from the Times Online. It 
lists global-scale consequences expected for up to six degrees of average temperature 
increase with a Europe-centered focus. 
Table 5.1: Global temperature change and CO2 targets (Lynas, 2008) 
Temp Change, °C Action Needed CO2 Target 
(Current = 380 ppm) 
0 – 1 Avoidance probably not possible 350 ppm 
1 – 2 Peak global emissions by 2015 400 ppm 
2 – 3 Peak global emissions by 2030 450 ppm 
3 – 4 Peak global emissions by 2050 550 ppm 
4 – 5 Allow constantly rising emissions 650 ppm 
5 – 6 Allow very high emissions 800 ppm 
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Table 5.2: Average Global Temperature Rise versus Consequences, adapted from Six 
Degrees by Mark Lynas 
Temperature 
Rise, °C 
Expected Consequences, Europe-Centered 
1 Ice-free sea absorbs more heat and accelerates global warming; fresh water 
lost from a third of the world's surface; low-lying coastlines flooded. 
2 Europeans [and other residents of the Northern Hemisphere] dying of 
heatstroke; forests ravaged by fire; stressed plants beginning to emit carbon 
rather than absorbing it; a third of all species face extinction. 
3 Carbon release from vegetation and soils speeds global warming; death of the 
Amazon rainforest; super-hurricanes hit coastal cities; starvation in Africa. 
4 Runaway thaw of permafrost makes global warming unstoppable; much of 
Britain made uninhabitable by severe flooding; Mediterranean region 
abandoned. 
5 Methane from ocean floor accelerates global warming; ice gone from both 
poles; humans migrate in search of food and try vainly to live like animals off 
the land. 
6 Life on Earth ends with apocalyptic storms, flash floods, hydrogen sulfide gas 
and methane released to atmosphere, only fungi survive. 
 
 
National Security Implications: 
 
International conflict would be likely as nations struggle to adapt with large-scale 
change and disruptions. Along with this conflict, border security would be difficult since 
millions of refugees would seek refuge from coastal areas.  Borders would become 
difficult to patrol and monitor with extreme weather events that accompany this scenario. 
Changes in precipitation patterns would alter food production and availability. Energy 
demands worldwide would surge. As energy prices escalate, tensions would likely 
increase and the race for Arctic energy resources would accelerate. 
From the CNAS report 
“In this scenario, addressed in Chapter IV, nations around the world will be 
overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic 
disease.  The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in 
the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in 
agricultural patterns and water availability.  The flooding of coastal communities 
around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and 
China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities.  Armed 
conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is 
likely and nuclear war is possible.  The social consequences range from increased 
religious fervor to outright chaos.  In this scenario, climate change provokes a 
permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature.” 
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Leading Indicators and Signposts for this Scenario: 
 
 Number and frequency of Arctic storm events; 
 Observed changes in key climate parameters and statistical weather information; 
 Physical observations of Arctic climate feedback processes and comparison to 
regional-scale models; 
 Rate of sea-level rise; 
 Rate of Greenland ice-sheet volume decrease. 
 
Science and Technology Challenges for Sandia: 
 
Estimations of trends and regional-scale climate modeling results will be needed on a 
much-accelerated basis to provide timely information to the policy, the intelligence, and 
the defense communities.  The crucial questions are where is the tipping point, how 
quickly are we approaching it, what is the uncertainty and safety margin, and what 
mitigation methods will be effective to avoid reaching that point? 
5.7.4 Scenario 4:  Abrupt collapse of the Arctic environment, global 
conflicts, and chaos 
The Scenario Story: “Collapse and Chaos” 
 
Recent data indicate that the Arctic is changing at a rate that significantly exceeds 
the most dramatic IPCC scenario.  Recognition of the vast and possibly vulnerable 
methane hydrate deposits and the potential for extreme weather to release carbon from 
the Yedoma permafrost implies the possibility of extremely rapid and dramatic changes.  
Precedents exist in the paleoclimate record for changes of 8° C or more within a few 
decades.  Such a scenario would bring into question the ability of governments to 
adequately respond to the resulting widespread humanitarian crises.  
The CSIS-CNAS report casts this catastrophic scenario in terms of energy and 
compared it with the current threat of terrorism.  Because of the abruptness of climate 
change in this scenario, it appears unlikely that sufficient resources exist to mount large 
scale adaptation efforts.  Limited defensive responses are more likely. 
Implications for National Security: 
 
Under this scenario, we expect 
 
 A chaotic rush for Arctic energy resources; 
 Military conflict in the Arctic; 
 Collapse of  Arctic ecology and infrastructure; 
 Extreme stresses on Arctic energy and transportation infrastructure leading to 
frequent outages; 
 Defensive responses to extreme climate stresses; 
 International conflict. 
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From the CNAS report. 
 
“This catastrophic-scenario would pose almost inconceivable challenges as human 
society struggled to adapt. It is by far the most difficult future to visualize without 
straining credulity. The scenario notes that understanding climate change in light of 
the other great threat of our age, terrorism, can be illuminating. Although distinct in 
nature, both threats are linked to energy use in the industrialized world, and, indeed, 
the solutions to both depend on transforming the world’s energy economy—
America’s energy economy in particular. The security community must come to grips 
with these linkages, because dealing with only one of these threats in isolation is 
likely to exacerbate the other, while dealing with them together can provide 
important synergies.” 
 
Leading Indicators and Signposts: 
 
Leading indicators and signposts are similar to those of the more benign first 
scenario.  In this scenario, identification of the “canaries” or critical points in these 
geophysical systems will be crucial. 
 Arctic sea ice volume and extent; 
 Glacial extents; 
 Greenland ice sheet; 
 Permafrost extent and depths; 
 Ocean salinity and circulation, particularly at high latitudes. 
 
Science and Technology Challenges for Sandia: 
 
The challenge in this scenario will be to deliver credible information to Sandia 
customers in time for that information to be useful.  Change will be extremely rapid in 
this scenario.  It may be possible to perform an analysis on whether and how society 
could adapt to and survive such a change. 
5.8 Conclusions from these scenarios  
5.8.1 Scenario 1: Manageable Adaptations 
The scenario map with physical climate cases plotted against rates of change is a 
means to visualize possible changes or system trajectories in the Earth climate system. 
Although we consider the first two physical climate cases used in Scenario 1 to be 
unlikely given current trends in greenhouse gas emission, Scenario 1 tells a hopeful story. 
Mitigation and adaptation are possible in this scenario for three physical climate cases. 
For all three, a crucial requirement is measurement of key Arctic climate indicators and 
use of these measurements in regional scale models.  Accurate measurements and 
credible regional scale models are the key to understanding the location and trajectory of 
the Arctic climate system. 
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5.8.2 Scenario 2: Weather Spikes, Climate Shocks 
Scenario 2 includes an acceleration of change and conflict.  The climate spikes and 
extreme weather of Scenario 2 will incur large economic costs.  Mitigation and 
adaptation are possible but will be complicated by international conflict that impedes 
cooperation.  Extreme weather in the Arctic will have a significant impact on energy and 
mineral exploration and production there.  There will be both winners and losers in this 
scenario as new shipping routes and access to Arctic resources opens with reductions in 
sea ice. 
5.8.3 Scenario 3: On the Brink 
Of these four scenarios, Scenario 3 is the most plausible, although it includes a 
measure of uncertainty associated with the range of temperature increase.  This increase 
will be linked to future greenhouse gas emissions.  At present, there is little evidence that 
growth in emissions, particularly carbon dioxide, will slow.  As shown in the ACIA 
report, Arctic temperatures will likely increase faster than global averages.  The dire 
consequences forecast for the high end of the chart from Six Degrees would occur earlier 
for Arctic regions.  IPCC estimates for emissions and temperature change may well prove 
to be too conservative, resulting in Scenario 4. 
5.8.4 Scenario 4: Collapse and Chaos 
Scenario 4 is our worst case.  This scenario assumes irreversible climate change and 
transition to a new and chaotic climate regime.  The CNAS report cited earlier compares 
this scenario with widespread terrorism in that both drivers are linked to energy.  
5.8.5 Common threads, common future assessment needs  
We concur with the Arctic Climate Impacts Assessment (ACIA) report regarding 
seven key areas in which attention and work are needed to improve future climate 
impacts assessment.  These needs cut across the four climate scenarios given in the 
preceding section.  They are: (ACIA, pg. 1019) 
1. Regional Impacts and Climate Models 
 
Better regional-scale modeling is an essential requirement for improved assessments. 
It is currently receiving attention as a climate-modeling research priority.  Improvements 
in regional scale modeling will facilitate better assessments of economic impacts and will 
enable better decision making. 
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2. Economic Impacts 
 
Economic impacts of climate change are difficult to quantify, especially without 
needed regional information.  Credible economic impacts are needed by policy and 
governmental decision makers, and assessments of these impacts will require regional-
scale modeling that is arguable accurate.  The Stern Report and other similar parallel 
efforts are recent steps toward assessing economic impacts. 
3. Assessing Vulnerabilities 
 
Climate impacts on interdependent, coupled systems are difficult to assess and 
require additional research.  For the present study, systems of importance to national 
security were considered.  However, these systems may be indirectly affected by climate 
change through couplings that include human interactions. 
4. Observations and Process Studies 
 
The recent under-prediction of changes in Arctic sea ice extent makes it clear that 
important climate processes are not well understood or captured in models.  Poorly 
understood processes range from physical systems such as cloud-aerosol-forcing 
interactions to human health and biota changes.  Because of the strong ice-albedo 
feedbacks, and teleconnections, the faulty prediction of the rate of retreat of the sea ice 
extent raises questions about other climate-related predictions. 
5. Long-Term Monitoring 
 
There are very few measurement sites in the Arctic from which reliable, climate-
scale records are available. The National Science Foundation, the US Department of 
Energy, NOAA, and international science agencies have recently placed a priority on 
long-term monitoring in the Arctic.  This current research emphasis must be sustained 
over coming decades in order for science and climate-modeling needs to be met. 
6. Climate Modeling 
 
High-resolution coupled regional models are needed for the Arctic region.  An 
initiative spearheaded by the University of Alaska Fairbanks/International Arctic 
Research Center for development and refinement of Arctic system models is attempting 
to improve on the current situation.  A suite of available models for the Arctic that can be 
interconnected and run with minimal customization is needed.  
7. Analysis of Impacts on Society 
 
A better understanding of likely impacts of Arctic climate change on global society 
and the uncertainty associated with these impacts are needed for decision makers.  The 
development and use of scenarios similar to those presented here but with expanded 
detail is one tool that can help decision makers allocate economic resources. 
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6. Approaches for Arctic Modeling 
Climate change in the Arctic has become indisputable, with many dramatic and 
unexpected changes.  Understanding this change and predicting future change will 
require a greatly improved Arctic modeling capability.  A recent Nature editorial   
(2008) mentioned several reasons why the climate change community needs to 
expand its Arctic modeling effort:  the surprising and unpredicted rate of Arctic sea 
ice decline in the past few summers, the unknown future of the Greenland ice sheet, 
and the repercussions of a very different Arctic on the rest of the Earth system. 
In this section we describe several approaches to Arctic climate modeling.  We 
will outline some of the approaches that have been used to model Arctic specific 
questions.  We focus on first-principle models as opposed to statistical correlation 
models.  First-principle models rely on developing equations which approximate the 
physical processes responsible for climate, which are then solved on modern high 
performance computers.  For most modeling work, the community relies on two types 
of models: global climate models (AOGCMs:  Atmosphere-Ocean General 
Circulation Models) which simulate as much as possible of the entire Earth system 
and regional climate models (RCMs) which focus on a limited area and can thus 
achieve much higher resolution with the same computational resources. 
6.1  AOGCMs 
AOGCMs consist of 4 major model components: Atmosphere, ocean, land, and sea 
ice.  The components are developed by separate teams and can usually run in a “stand-
alone” mode where they are driven by initial conditions from observational data sets or 
idealized climates and specified greenhouse gas emission scenarios.  In an AOGCM, 
components are coupled together and run concurrently.  Significant computing resources 
are required to run these large models.  A typical climate simulation can take a month or 
longer running full time on several hundred processors.  The scalability of current 
AOGCMs is limited by the atmospheric component making it difficult to exploit the 
latest massively parallel computers with tens of thousands of processors.  This lack of 
scalability limits current AOGCMs to horizontal resolutions of about 100 km.  However, 
next generation AOGCMs with more scalable components are expected to be much 
improved, allowing for long climate simulations at resolutions closer to 10 km. 
The strengths and limitations of both AOGCMs and RCMs were recently assessed in 
great detail by (Bader, et al., 2008).  They discuss the ability of modern AOGCMs to 
reproduce a wide range of features of the Earth’s climate, such as statistical properties 
and trends of the global mean temperature, tropical and extra-tropical storms, monsoons, 
the Madden-Julian and El Nino southern oscillations (ENSO), sea ice, ocean circulation, 
and extreme events.  Here we summarize their well-referenced findings, focusing on how 
these results apply to Arctic modeling. 
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Modern AOGCMs do a remarkable job at reproducing many aspects of the Earth’s 
climate and they continue to improve.  Quantities well-modeled by AOGCMs include 
mean surface temperature and precipitation at the continental scales, including trends 
such as the twentieth century mean-surface-temperature warming.  Models also do a good 
job at capturing statistical properties such as the frequency of heat waves and variability 
of mid-latitude winds.  That quantity is a measure of how well the models capture the 
Pacific and Atlantic mean storm tracks.  The ability of models to capture details of these 
tracks further improves as the models increase horizontal and vertical resolution and 
improve their representation of tropical precipitation.  In the Arctic, most of the 
interannual variability is contained in the Arctic Oscillation.  AOGCMs do a fair job of 
capturing this oscillation. 
Quantities not well modeled in AOGCMs include finer details of both temperature 
and precipitation.  For precipitation, the errors are largest in the tropics. There are also 
large errors in the day-night cycle and the separation between light, medium, and heavy 
rains.  Of more direct interest to us, the errors in the seasonal mean temperatures in the 
CCSM3 AOGCM are quite large (up to 12° C too warm) in the Arctic.   Most AOGCMs 
have difficulty capturing frequency and amplitude of North Atlantic blocking events, 
which leads to an incorrect tilt in the Atlantic storm track.  Tropical storms are not 
simulated very well in today’s AOGCMs due in part to their low spatial resolution.  
Bader et al. (2008) suggest that AOGCMs running at 20 km global resolution will be 
adequate for models to represent many aspects of tropical storms except for storm 
intensity.  For past Arctic warming events, the climate shifts simulated by AOGCMs are 
considerably slower than the observed ones (Flückiger, 2008), which could be due to 
“missing feedbacks, the wrong forcing of the abrupt shifts, or a misguided focus on 
changes in ocean circulation or temperature,” rather than other aspects of the climate 
system like atmospheric wind patterns.   
For Arctic modeling, Bader et al. (2008) identify several areas in AOGCMs which 
can be improved:  model resolution, snow, permafrost and soil freeze/thaw models, and 
the incorporation of land ice sheet models. 
6.2  Improved resolution with RCMs 
There are many reasons to perform climate simulations at higher resolutions than can 
be obtained by current AOGCMs.  Aspects of AOGCM simulations which are improved 
with resolution mentioned above included mid-latitude storm track structure, tropical 
cyclones and details of Arctic climate change.  In addition, Bader et al. (2008) also 
attribute part of climate modeling community's progress in improved simulations of 
ENSO variability to increased resolution within the ocean model component of 
AOGCMs.  Note of course that resolution by itself does not improve all aspects of a 
simulation.  There will always be physical processes that must be parameterized, and 
many gains in simulation quality will be obtained through improving these 
parameterizations.      
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One can obtain resolutions on the order of 10 km with only moderate computer 
resources by using RCMs.  High resolution is made possible because the models work 
with a much smaller computational domain such as the western U.S.  Because they are 
not global, they require boundary conditions at the edges of their computational domain.  
For future climate simulations, these lateral boundary conditions must be obtained from 
AOGCM simulations.  These types of simulations are an example of downscaling.  The 
requirement of using lateral boundary conditions from AOGCM simulations does present 
some difficulties.  RCM results have been shown to be particularly sensitive to the large 
scale atmospheric circulation patterns in the driving AOGCM (Stephenson and Pavan, 
2003).  For example, the poor representation of North Atlantic blocking in AOGCMs 
mentioned above suggests that a regional model of Europe driven by such an AOGCM 
will fail to reproduce many important regional features of the European climate (van 
Ulden and van Oldenborgh, 2006).  Another current difficulty with RCMs is that there is 
no good mechanism for feeding regional effects back to the global scale for RCM 
downscaling.  Influence flows only from global to regional scale. 
Despite these difficulties, the increased resolution made possible by RCMs improves 
many aspects of climate simulations.  One of the biggest improvements to be had with the 
increased RCM resolution is in the simulations of precipitation patterns and heavy 
precipitation events.   Recent work has shown that downscaling with an RCM running at 
18 km resolution can obtain reasonable simulations of Atlantic hurricane frequency 
including the increasing frequency trend of the last 30 years (Knutson, et al., 2007).   
Another recent example of the usefulness of RCMs comes from (Evans, 2008), who 
showed that for the middle east, AOGCMs with O(150 km) resolution were predicting a 
loss of about 170,000 km2 due to drought, but when an RCM with 27-km resolution was 
used (which could include the effects of the Zagros Mountains on the moisture-bearing 
winds) the same region was predicted to see an 50% increase in annual rainfall.  
The need for regional climate modeling was further explained in recent 
Congressional testimony (Avissar, 2007):  “Simulations produced with AOGCMs miss 
significant processes that drive the climate response in somewhat unexpected ways.  As 
an example to demonstrate this issue, simulations of deforestation of the Amazon Basin 
are produced with a state-of-the-art regional climate model, namely the Regional 
Atmospheric Modeling System (RAMS) developed at Colorado State University.  By 
using much better resolution than that typically adopted in AOGCMs, land-atmosphere 
interactions (including clouds and precipitation) are simulated more accurately with 
regional models.” 
For the application of RCMs to the Arctic, we quote (Dethloff, et al., 2004): “A 
high-resolution regional climate model (RCM) is a powerful tool for improving the 
simulation of regional effects of the Arctic climate as a result of finer resolved orography 
and land- sea contrasts, better resolved nonlinear interactions between the large- and 
meso-scales, improved simulations of hydrodynamic instabilities and synoptic cyclones, 
and improved description of hydrological and precipitation processes”   
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6.3  Local mesh refinement for downscaling 
One approach which will probably see more use in the future is AOGCMs which 
allow for local mesh refinement, resulting in much higher resolution over key regions of 
interest within a single AOGCM.  One popular approach has been the stretched grid, 
where the grid in the atmospheric component is smooth stretched to focus additional 
resolution in a single regional area of interest.  Next-generation models will most likely 
be capable of using full unstructured grids.  In fact, Sandia's work in support of the DOE 
Climate Change Prediction Program involves the integration of a spectral element 
atmospheric model into the NCAR Community Climate System Model (one of the two 
U.S. flagship AOGCMs used for climate change research).  This atmospheric model has 
not yet been used for downscaling with local mesh refinement within an AOGCM setting, 
but in idealized settings, it has been shown to work well even with grids where the finest 
resolution is 10 times finer then the coarsest resolution (Fournier, et al., 2004; 
Jablonowski, et al., 2008).   
6.4  Approaches to Arctic modeling 
The vast majority of Arctic modeling studies rely on AOGCMs running at relatively 
low resolution.  Some recent examples include (Min, et al., 2008), who showed a human-
induced moistening in the Arctic from greenhouse gases and surface aerosols.  They 
studied both observations and compared AOGCM output collected by the CMIP3 
(Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 3). (Holland, et al., 2006) used AOGCM 
ensembles at 140 km resolution to study abrupt reductions in the summer Arctic sea ice.   
(Sewall and Sloan, 2004) used an AOGCM running at 300 km to study future Arctic sea 
surface temperature and sea ice extent distribution, showing that a reduction in sea ice 
thickness results in a significant drying of western North America.  (Zhang, et al., 2008) 
used a global ocean model and sea-ice model, forced by NCEP/NCAR reanalysis data, to 
identify the main causes of the unprecedented retreat of Arctic sea ice in 2007.  Very long 
AOGCM simulations were used by (Hall and Stouffer, 2001) to find that abrupt climate 
change events near Greenland are triggered solely by the model's internal variability.  
Two AOGCMs were used to study the Arctic oscillation by (Zorita and Gonzalez-Rouco, 
2000) who showed that models disagreed on long-term trends of the Arctic oscillation 
intensity.   
RCMs have also been used to study the Arctic.  (Dethloff, et al., 2004) used an RCM 
running at 50 km resolution and driven by an AOGCM to study the impact of 
deglaciation of Greenland on the Arctic circulation and storm tracks.  A similar model 
configuration was used to show how “Arctic processes can feed back on the global 
climate system via an atmospheric wave bridge between the energy source in the tropics 
and the energy sink in the polar regions” by (Dethloff, et al., 2006).  The same approach 
was also used to study the significant climate effect of Arctic Haze by (Rinke, et al., 
2004) and to look at future climate changes in frequency and intensity of extreme 
temperature and precipitation in the Arctic by  (Saha, et al., 2006).  An RCM land model, 
driven by an 1940-1998 observational data set was used by (Stieglitz, et al., 2003) to 
study how future changes in snow cover will impact warming below ground, which in 
turn can result in the loss of terrestrial carbon.   
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6.5  Sandia capabilities 
As shown above, most Arctic climate simulations to date have been made at very 
low resolutions with AOGCM models, or at moderate resolutions on the order of 20 km 
with RCMs.  With the advent of petascale computers currently being acquired by the 
DOE and NSF, the climate community will soon have the ability and resources to make 
routine AOGCM simulations at 10 km resolutions.  Sandia has made a key contribution 
to this goal.  For our part of the DOE SciDAC Earth System Modeling project, we have 
been working to eliminate the largest roadblock to the petascale-readiness of modern 
AOGCMs: the ability of the atmospheric component model to show increased 
performance commensurate with increases in computer resources, i.e., “scale.”  Our work 
integrating the spectral element method into the NCAR CCSM has allowed the CCSM to 
use true two-dimensional domain decomposition for the first time, leading to 
unprecedented scalability demonstrated on LLNL's BG/L computer system.  The new 
model scales well out to 96,000 processors with an average grid spacing of 25 km.  Even 
better scalability will be possible when computing with a global resolution of 10 km, 
allowing us to obtain realistic climate integration rates at 10 km resolution on the 
upcoming petascale machines.  For our initial simulations, we used prescribed surface 
temperatures and without the CCSM land and ice models.  Coupling with the other 
CCSM component models is in progress now.    
This will represent a new regime for AOGCMs.  Work will be required to understand 
how to most make effective use of such a dramatic increase in resolution.   Many subgrid 
parameterizations will have to be replaced or updated.  As Sandia is playing a key roll in 
making this work possible, we should also use our modeling expertise and computational 
resources to create a state-of-the-art Arctic modeling capability that will allow us to 
address the important issues in Arctic climate change outlined in our previous sections.   
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7. Roles for Sandia and Emerging Opportunities 
We believe that Sandia has the capability to contribute to understanding of climate 
change and its near-term national security impacts.  Most climate research focuses on 
“best estimate” projections, or most-probable expectations.  This approach is the most 
conservative from the perspective of scientific understanding, but tends to err on the side 
of optimism from the perspective of potential consequences.  By contrast, we believe that 
Sandia’s role, as a national laboratory, should be to focus on high-consequence, less 
probable scenarios.  This focus is more conservative from an engineering perspective 
because it asks the question:  “What is the worst thing that can happen, and what would 
be the national security consequences?”  In this section, we list the areas in which Sandia 
has the most to offer to help evaluate this question. 
Arctic hydrological cycle.  With several million square km of ice-free open water, there 
will be much more evaporation.  Where will all this water vapor go?  Will there be major 
storms of an unprecedented magnitude somewhere?  Will there be major changes in 
accumulation on Greenland or other land masses?  Will some areas become inaccessible?  
Will Siberia become a temperate rainforest?  SNL should run high-resolution global 
models with regional refinement in the Arctic to seek robust emergent weather 
phenomena associated with these new conditions. 
Global ocean circulation.  With an uncapped Arctic Ocean, the sea surface boundary 
conditions will change.  Evaporation will change temperature and salinity of Arctic 
surface waters. Will the patterns of sea ice converge on some new equilibrium?  Will 
"flushing" locations of thermohaline circulation migrate from the north Atlantic into the 
Arctic?  Will increased freshwater from the Siberian and North American rivers create a 
freshwater cap?  Will a new wind-driven circumpolar surface current emerge in the 
Arctic that couples to the Atlantic and Pacific in a way that "wags the global dog"?  
Sandia should run a series of exploratory high-resolution coupled simulations in an 
attempt to discover new phenomena before they are observed. 
Permafrost stability.  Permafrost is rapidly deteriorating.  How much longer will it 
survive?  How should structures be designed so they have sufficiently long lifetimes, 
regardless of what happens to the permafrost?  Can the feedbacks due to rapid release of 
permafrost-bound methane be quantified?   Sandia should develop the capability to model 
the stability of permafrost with focus on volatilization of methane, ecosystem stability, 
and engineering for infrastructure (military, industrial, and domestic).  This is a multi-
disciplinary problem that requires expertise in fields as diverse as solid mechanics and 
soil ecology. 
Greenland ice sheet stability. The net loss of ice from Greenland is accelerating.  Is the 
Greenland ice sheet reaching its own tipping point?  What is the worst-case scenario that 
is physically viable?  What are the early-warning signs of tipping, and can changes be 
predicted?   Can a full-physics high-fidelity model be developed?  Sandia should employ 
multiscale, multi-phase 3D high-fidelity solid dynamics with radiation and heat transport 
to model the mobilization of the Greenland ice sheet and consequent global sea level rise.  
Sandia already has many tools that can be applied to this problem. 
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Coastal erosion.  The loss of sea ice has led to erosion of coastlines that had formerly 
been protected.  The cost of shoring up structures, building barriers, and relocating entire 
villages and towns worldwide is staggering.   Depending on how the relocation is 
implemented, these solutions may only be temporary.  Coastal erosion is affected not 
only by loss of sea ice but by sea level rise as well.  Are other, currently-protected coasts 
likely to become vulnerable?  How can structures be designed for 100-year events when 
there is no record that relates to current (or future) conditions?  Sandia should apply a 
high-resolution coupled regional Arctic model to predict frequencies and locations of 
severe storms that dominate coastal erosion. 
Thresholds and sensitivity.  Many scientists are suggesting that the Arctic sea ice is 
reaching a point of no return.  Are there other unanticipated thresholds in the Arctic 
system?  Can the rapid change in one subsystem (e.g. sea ice) cascade into other 
subsystems in a downward spiral that leads to an abrupt collapse?  Sandia should identify 
candidate system "tipping points"34 in the Arctic and use regional models to seek 
precursory phenomena associated with runaway effects of climate change.  Modeling and 
simulation groups should work with satellite and instrumentation groups to develop 
advanced monitoring or "early warning" systems for notifying decision makers when 
accelerating effects of climate change are imminent. 
Socio-economic Consequence Models. Governments and multinational corporations 
have noted the vast resources the Arctic offers and the dramatic reduction in shipping 
costs that ice-free passages afford.  Successful claims of sovereignty in the area will reap 
huge economic and geopolitical benefits.  Will critical paths for the northern 
hemisphere’s supply chains tend to overlap or mesh in the Arctic?   Through its NISAC 
capability and other behavioral/socio-economic modeling efforts, Sandia can address the 
tensions and consequence of Arctic exploitation.  Sandia should utilize its infrastructure 
and supply-chain expertise to determine the risk to U.S. strategic resources and the 
options to protect national security interests in the region.  
Uncertainty quantification.  Decisions associated with mitigation or adaptation will be 
made under conditions of uncertainty because the Arctic system is nonlinear and 
complex, so perfect knowledge is unattainable.   Can the uncertainty in future loss of sea 
ice, Greenland ice sheet melting rates, permafrost disintegration, and coastal erosion be 
rigorously quantified?   Uncertainties are highly asymmetric with respect to 
consequences.  Erring on the optimistic side (as was the case for sea-ice loss predictions) 
is much more dangerous than erring on the cautious side.  Sandia should pay special 
attention to quantifying uncertainty associated with the high-consequence scenarios. 
Arctic observations.  Any modeling effort needs to be backed up by observations to 
ascertain how well the evolving model actually performs. The observations provide 
feedback for development of the model to assure continual improvement.  Through the 
DOE/Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) program, Sandia already has a robust 
foothold in Arctic observations – a climate research station on the North Slope of 
Alaska35, and participation in the research community making in situ measurements 
throughout the circumpolar Arctic, as well as the communities using satellite remote 
sensing and unmanned (and manned) aircraft systems for making both remotely-sensed 
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and in situ measurements there.  Use of multi-spectral satellite and aircraft-based remote 
sensors is particularly valuable when coordinated with ground facilities that provide 
measurement validation (see Appendix A1).  Fixed ground level observation stations 
provide the most reliable measurements, but the costs are such that there can never be 
enough such stations to meet model verification needs. 
 
Arctic System Model.  The need to understand the Arctic as an integrated system is well 
recognized within the research community.  In May of 2008, a planning workshop hosted 
by the University of Alaska Fairbanks and held at the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research in Boulder focused on needs for the Community Arctic System Model Project 
and the high-resolution modeling resources needed to achieve that integrated model.  An 
Arctic System Model, analogous to community global circulation models, would provide 
a common  high-performance computing environment  for linking regional ocean-ice, 
atmospheric, terrestrial, ecosystem, glacier, and social-dimension models.  Efforts to 
build a Community Arctic System Model are still in an early stage and it is possible for 
Sandia to effectively engage in that effort.  The Arctic System Model links to current 
work at Sandia in the area of Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems (e.g. Glass, et al., 
2007). 
 
Science and Technology Needs for Improved Arctic Observations and Atmospheric 
Measurements.  Climate-related measurements are sparse or simply not available for 
large regions of the Arctic.  Precipitation measurements, thermodynamic parameters of 
the atmosphere, cloud extent and type, ice volume, and many other geophysical 
parameters of importance to climate modelers are needed at higher temporal and 
geographical resolutions to facilitate regional-scale modeling of the Arctic.  Sandia can 
contribute to improved observation through better sensors and sensing platforms.  These 
include Unmanned Vehicles (aerial and surface), satellite sensing capabilities, 
atmospheric sensors, lightweight Synthetic Aperture Radar (for UAV applications), and 
hyper-spectral and multi-spectral sensors for UAVs and satellites. 
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8. Conclusions 
The Arctic region is already experiencing the rapid climate change that had been 
predicted, and the changes are accelerating.  These changes include increases in surface 
air temperatures, loss of sea ice, coastal erosion, permafrost degradation, melting of the 
Greenland ice sheet, changes in clouds and aerosols and their radiative properties, 
changes in weather and precipitation patterns, and possible long-term atmospheric and 
ocean circulation changes.  Evidence from Greenland ice cores and other sources suggest 
that the Arctic climate has changed very abruptly in the past, and there is no a priori 
reason to believe that it cannot change just as quickly and erratically in response to the 
present rapid increases in radiative forcing from inadvertent human modification of the 
atmospheric composition. 
Consequences of Arctic climate change are already evident.  Future consequences 
depend on the degree and nature of future changes, which are highly uncertain with 
regard to timing.  The reduction in sea ice is already opening up shipping routes and 
increasing the opportunities for oil, gas, and mineral exploration and exploitation.  This is 
creating territorial disputes and increasing international tensions, leading to an increased 
militarization of the Arctic.  Coastal erosion and permafrost loss has caused damage to 
infrastructure, and increased engineering costs.  Ecosystems are suffering from the rapid 
changes, with cascading consequences for fisheries and indigenous populations.  The net 
loss of ice from Greenland is leading to increases in sea level rise, which has a global 
impact.   
Anticipation of future consequences requires the best possible projections of future 
climate changes, with uncertainty quantification.  Because consequences are a strong 
function of the degree and speed of change, more attention needs to be given to the high-
consequence scenarios.  Sandia has wide-ranging competencies and an engineering and 
systems outlook that can be applied to this problem.  High performance computing 
resources can be used to run regional circulation models to define the range of possible 
changes to the Arctic hydrological cycle and circulation, which will have global 
consequences.  Multi-disciplinary models using Sandia’s expertise ranging from soil 
ecology to solid mechanics and multi-phase flow can be applied to analysis of permafrost 
stability, Greenland ice sheet dynamics, and coastal erosion.  We can apply Sandia’s 
special optimization know-how to quantify uncertainty and better understand sensitivities 
and thresholds.  At the human interface, we can use systems dynamics and 
microeconomic models, coupled with physical models, to characterize socioeconomic 
consequences.  Finally, because Sandia is already actively engaged in observational 
studies of the Arctic, we can expand and integrate observational studies with modeling 
and simulation, providing model validation as well as guidance for future observational 
work. 
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From a systems perspective, we believe that the best approach is one that treats risks 
associated with climate change much like a complex, nonlinear, dynamic engineering 
problem.  We start by examining the worst case(s) that could reasonably be expected, and 
what the consequences would be for those cases.  For the modeling, we are particularly 
interested in discovery of emergent, robust, high-consequence phenomena.  By running 
simulations at unprecedented high resolution–updated with the latest data–we intend to 
focus on finding emergent phenomena or patterns that would not be predicted by first 
principles reasoning or intuition.  We are primarily interested in phenomena that are 
robust, i.e. are independent of the details of the simulations (specific parameterizations, 
tunings, or resolution) so that we can have confidence that they are real.  Finally, as a 
national laboratory, our focus should be on those phenomena that have the greatest 
potential for national security consequences.
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Appendices 
A1. Sandia Participation in Satellite and Aircraft Measurements in the 
Arctic 
In 2000, the Multi-Spectral Thermal Imager (MTI)36 was launched with DOE support.  
Sandia, Los Alamos and Savannah River were involved in the joint MTI program.  It was 
to be a three year demonstration program for application to the DOE non-proliferation 
effort.  MTI has an imaging system with 5 m resolution in its visible bands, and 20 m 
resolution in its IR bands (nadir-pointing; 15 bands in all).  However, MTI continued to 
be functional long after the 3 year demo program was over.  Subsequently, Sandia 
inherited the sole operating responsibility for MTI, but at a much lower level of support. 
 
MTI has been used on an as-available basis for imaging the North Slope of Alaska (NSA) 
ARM Climate Research Facility (ACRF) since mid 2002.  As the Arctic sea ice recedes, 
there is great interest in using satellite remote sensing resources not only for geophysical 
monitoring, but for potential Homeland Security monitoring as well.  In particular, it 
appears that, given an adequate thermal gradient at the water surface, ships leave thermal 
wakes behind that are detectable by satellite for a substantial period of time after their 
passage.  MTI has been used to investigate this phenomenon in the Arctic.  MTI also has 
been seen to provide interesting insights regarding sea ice, especially the refreezing of 
leads (breaks in the ice).  
 
The NSA ACRF has also been used routinely to provide validation data for other satellite 
remote sensors. 
 
With regard to aircraft measurements in the Arctic, Sandia has participated in a number 
of field campaigns centered on the North Slope of Alaska ACRF. Looking forward, 
Sandia is developing for DOE an unmanned aircraft hosting capability at Oliktok Point as 
part of the NSA ACRF.  Oliktok Point is the location of a USAF Long Range Radar 
Station on the shore of the Arctic Ocean at which an earlier ARM field campaign was 
based.  We anticipate that it will provide ideal access for unmanned aircraft to the Arctic 
Ocean.  Through Sandia, DOE has acquired FAA restricted airspace at Oliktok Point that 
will be useful in connection with hosting unmanned aircraft there.   
 
A2.   Arctic Climate Scenarios Development and Selection 
A.  From Schwartz, Peter. The Art of the Long View. Doubleday. New York. 1991 – 
Appendix, Steps to Developing Scenarios 
 
Step One:  Identify The Focal Issue Or Decision. 
 Begin with a specific decision or issue and then build out toward the environment. 
 Develop scenarios from ‘the inside out’ rather than ‘the outside in.’ 
 What is keeping you awake at night (or will be keeping you awake at night)? 
 
Step Two:  Identify The Key Forces In The Local Environment. 
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 What will decision-makers want to know when making key choices? 
 What will be seen as success or failure? 
 What are the considerations that will shape these outcomes? 
 
Step Three:  Identify Driving Forces. 
 What are the macro forces behind the forces listed in step two? 
 What are the major trends and the trend breaks? 
 This step tends to be research intensive; this is where we inform our future stories.  
 
Step Four:  Rank By Importance And Uncertainty. 
 Rank the key factors and driving trends on the basis of two criteria: 
1. The degree of importance for the success of the focal issue or decision 
identified in Step One and  
2. The degree of uncertainty surrounding those factors and trends. 
 The point is to identify the two or three factors or trends that are most important 
and most uncertain. 
 This step determines the axes along which the scenarios will differ. 
 
Step Five:  Selecting Scenario Logics 
 When the axes of crucial uncertainties have been identified, present them as a 
spectrum (one axis), matrix (two axes), or volume (three axes).  
 Attempt to identify the basic scenario logics to the point where stories emerge. 
 Identify the logic of challenges and responses. 
 
Step Six:  Flesh Out The Scenarios 
 Use the key factors and trends to add substance to the basic scenarios. 
 Attempt to answer who, what why, where, when, and how for each scenario. 
 Build narratives. 
 
Step Seven:  Indentify the Implications 
 How does the decision look in each scenario? 
 What vulnerabilities have been revealed? 
 Is the decision or strategy good in all scenarios, just one scenario, a few?  If it is 
good in only one or two of several scenarios, it should be considered high risk. 
 
Step Eight:  Selection of Leading Indicators and Signposts 
 “It is important to know as soon as possible which of several scenarios is closest 
to the course of history as it actually unfolds.” 
 Select key leading indicators, signposts, and points to monitor 
 Build adjustment plans 
 
Additional Considerations for Creating Scenarios 
(1) Beware of ending up with three scenarios since it will be tempting to pick the 
“middle” or most likely scenario. Also, avoid too many scenarios. 
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(2) In general, avoid assigning probabilities to different scenarios because it will bias 
choices towards most probable scenarios.  
(3) Choose scenario names carefully. Names should telegraph the scenario logics and 
should be vivid. 
(4) Ideally, scenario development teams should include  
a. management who make and implement decisions; 
b. a broad range of functions and divisions; 
c. “imaginative people who work well together as a team.” 
(5) “You can tell you have good scenarios when they are both plausible and surprising.” 
 
B. From Arctic Climate Impact Assessment - Scientific Report, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
 
“Selection of climate scenarios for impact assessments is always controversial and 
vulnerable to criticism (Smith, et al., 1998).The following criteria are suggested (Mearns, 
et al., 2001) for climate scenarios to be most useful to impact assessors and policy 
makers:  
(1) consistency with global warming projections over the period 1990 to 2100 
ranging from 1.4 to 5.8 ºC (IPCC, 2001a);  
(2) physical plausibility;  
(3) applicability in impact assessments, providing a sufficient number of variables across 
relevant temporal and spatial scales;  
(4) representativeness, reflecting the potential range of future regional climate change; 
and  
(5) accessibility.  It is preferable for impact researchers to use several climate scenarios, 
generated by different models where possible, in order to evaluate a greater range of 
possible futures.  Practical limitations, however, typically mean researchers can only 
work with a small number of climate scenarios.” 
 
C. Future collaborations for scenario building 
 
We have many colleagues throughout the climate science community who would be 
willing to participate in a multi-day workshop leading to detailed climate scenario 
development concentrating on national security impacts.  A few of these possible 
participants stand out. 
Our colleagues at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, were heavily involved with 
development of the often-cited Arctic Climate Impacts Assessment Report (2005). 
Research and academic centers with relevant expertise in climate impacts include the 
International Arctic Research Center, the Institute of Northern Engineering, and the 
Geophysical Institute. 
At the University of Washington, the Climate Impacts Group,  the Joint Institute for 
the Study of the Atmosphere and Ocean, and the Atmospheric Sciences Department all 
have strong research interests and field campaign experience in Arctic regions.  Sandia 
has collaborated with key personnel from these centers in the past. 
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Sandia staff members have collaborative ties to researchers from NOAA, the Naval 
Postgraduate School, NCAR, and other federally-sponsored organizations with active 
research interests and capabilities in Arctic regions. 
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